Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization by Foscarinis, Maria
Downward Spiral:.
Homelessness and Its Criminalization
Maria Foscarinis t
A city council recently developed a policy that homeless residents "are no
longer welcome in the City."' City memoranda describe a plan "continually
[to] remov[e] [homeless people] from the places that they are frequenting in the
City.". In one phase of what a court later described as the city's "war on the
homeless,"' police conducted a "harassment sweep" in which homeless people
"were handcuffed, transported to an athletic field for booking, chained to
benches, marked with numbers, and held for as long as six hours before being
released to another location, some for such crimes as dropping a match, a leaf,
or a piece of paper or jaywalking." 3
Over the past decade, as homelessness has increased across the country,4
the number of people living in public places has also grown.5 Emergency
shelters, the primary source of assistance, do not provide sufficient space to
meet the need even for temporary overnight accommodations; on any given
night there are at least as many people living in public as there are sheltered.6
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1. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 387-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded, 272
P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994),judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995). The municipal memorandum quoted
by the court used the more pejorative term "vagrant" rather than "homeless." 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387-
88.
2. Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389.
3. Id.
4. See generally U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND
HomELESSNEss IN AMEmCA'S Crrms: 1995 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT]; MARTHA R.
BURT, OvER THE EDGE: THE GROWrH OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE 1980s (1992) [hereinafter BURT,
OVER THE EDGE]; James D. Wright & Joel A. Devine, Housing Dynamics ofthe Homeless: Implications
for a Count, 65 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320 (1995). But see CHRISTOPHER JENKS, THE
HOMELESS 17 (1994) (contending that number of homeless people peaked in 1987-88).
5. Wright & Devine, supra note 4, at 323. Some social scientists suggest that the number of
homeless persons living in public places is increasing. Id. at 323. But see JENKS, supra note 4, at 17
(stating that number of homeless people in public places peaked in 1987-88).
6. Wright & Devine, supra note 4, at 323 (describing range from "conservative" one-to-one
estimate to ten times as many homeless people on the streets as in shelters).
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Moreover, shelters typically require their residents to leave during the day.7
Several hundred thousand people have nowhere to sleep but public places; at
least twice that number have nowhere to be during the day save public places.'
Increasingly, local governments are using criminal laws to address the
presence of homeless people in public places.9 Some cities are enacting and
penalizing activities associated with homelessness, such as sleeping, sitting, and
begging in public places.10 Others are using rarely enforced laws, such as
prohibitions on vagrancy and loitering, to conduct "sweeps" aimed at homeless
people." Restrictions on providers of aid to homeless people are also
prevalent. " Santa Ana's concerted, deliberate, and documented effort to force
its homeless residents out, summarized above, is a dramatic example of a
growing national phenomenon. 3
Constitutional challenges to such laws and practices have been filed in
courts across the country. City actions have been invalidated as unconstitutional
in some cases.' 4 They have been upheld in others as legitimate efforts to
regulate public space." One leading court decision ordered the city to create
"safe zones" for homeless people, in effect invalidating city actions as
unconstitutional in only part of the city. 6 In analyzing the constitutional
issues raised, courts have adopted a variety of sometimes conflicting approaches. 7
7. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT
AND RESEARCH, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE HOMELESS AND EMERGENCY SHELTERS 38
(1988) [hereinafter HUD SHELTER REPORT].
8. See infra Section L.A for a discussion of the numbers of homeless people and the aid available
to them.
9. See generally NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, No HOMELESS PEOPLE
ALLOWED (1994) [hereinafter No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED]; NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, THE RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE (1993) [hereinafter RIGHT TO REMAIN
NOWHERE]; NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL (1991)
[hereinafter GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL].
10. See generally RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9; NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED,
supra note 9; GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 9.
11. See generally RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9; NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED,
supra note 9; Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 9.
12. See NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO ROOM FOR THE INN ii (1995)
[hereinafter NO ROOM FOR THE INN]. It is not possible to state with certainty that such restrictions are
actually increasing. However, based on reports from many areas across the country it is possible to
make an informed supposition that they are.
13. See generally RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9; NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED,
supra note 9; GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 9.
14. E.g., Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); Pottinger v. City
of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Blair v. Shanaban, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal.
1991); Richard v. Nevada, CV-S-90-51-HDM (D. Nev. 1991).
15. E.g., Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990); Joyce v. City
of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded, 272 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994), judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal.
1995).
16. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1584.
17. Compare Young, 903 F.2d 146, with Loper, 999 F.2d 699, and Blair, 778 F. Supp. 1315;
compare Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. 1507, and Church v. City of Huntsville, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S,
1993 WL 646401 (N.D. Ala. 1993), preliminary injunction vacated, 30 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1994),
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During the 1980s, efforts to establish a "right to shelter" defined much of
the activism, litigation, and debate about homelessness.18 Now, efforts to
criminalize activities associated with homelessness are playing that defining
role.19 This evolution follows the failure to address homelessness adequately,
and the inability of shelter alone to do so. The trend toward criminalization
threatens a further spiraling of minimal aspiration and standard from a cot in
a shelter to a spot on the street. At the same time, much of the debate it has
sparked presumes a polarity between the "public's" interest in orderly public
places and homeless persons' "right" to sleep and beg in public.'
Seeking to reverse the fall, this Article rejects that polarity. It rests instead
on the premise that everyone has an interest in pleasant public places and that
no one has an interest in living on the street. Activism and debate should focus
on addressing the conditions that require people to live on the street, by
defining and implementing solutions to homelessness. Longer-term measures
that address the causes of homelessness-as opposed to merely providing
emergency relief-offer the only realistic possibility of doing so.
The Article begins with an overview of homelessness in America, including
a summary of its size, nature, and causes. The Article reviews recent efforts
by local governments to criminalize activities associated with homelessness,
focusing on three major categories: begging, public place, and indirect
restrictions. It discusses the purposes and effects of criminalization, noting that
a common underlying goal is the removal of homeless people from all or
selected city areas.
The Article reviews recent court rulings in litigation challenging the
constitutionality of such local government actions. It discusses divergent results
and analyses, identifies common themes, and argues for a fact-based approach.
The Article proposes that laws criminalizing activities associated with
homelessness are unlikely to be both constitutional and effective in meeting
their goals.
with Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843.
18. See, e.g., HERITAGEFOUNDATION, RETHNmNGPOLICY ON HOMELESSNESS 43 (1988); Robert
Ellickson, The Untenable Casefor an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17,
23-27 (1992); Maria Fosearinis, Beyond Homelessness: Ethics, Advocacy, and Strategy, 12 ST. LOUIS
PUB. L. REV. 37, 44-51 (1993); Kim Hopper, The Ordeal of Shelter: Continuities and Discontinuities
in the Public Response to Homelessness, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 301, 317-19
(1992); David Whitman, Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, in THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
RETHINKING POLICY ON HOMELESSNESS 43 (1988).
19. See RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9; No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note
9; Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 9. This shift in emphasis is indicative of the direction in which
societal response to homelessness has moved over the past decade and a half.
20. See, e.g., Robert C. Eilickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in Public Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996); Robert Tier, Let's
Restore Urban Civility to City Streets, 5 CuP REPORT 3 (1994); Vivian Rothstein, Their Space Is Ours,
Too, N.Y. TIaMs, Dec. 19, 1993, at 13; Letter from Mark Sidran, Candidate for City Attorney, Seattle,
WA, to George Sander, Chairman, King County Democratic Party (Sept. 27, 1993) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Sidran Letter].
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Next, the Article focuses on public policy concerns. The Article identifies
major justifications for criminalizing responses, including public opinion, and
aesthetic, safety, economic and social policy concerns. The Article discusses
public opinion polls which show that the majority of the public supports
increased aid to homeless people and opposes efforts to remove them from
public places. The Article then discusses other policy concerns, recognizing the
legitimacy of some, but concluding that they do not justify criminalization
efforts.
The Article identifies three emerging city responses to court rulings: a
reactive approach that imposes modified restrictions in an effort to come within
constitutional limits; a "safe zone" approach that protects but also isolates
homeless people in certain city areas; and a proactive approach that seeks to
address the causes of homelessness. The Article argues that the proactive
approach offers the best possibility for a solution that is both constitutional and
effective.
I. INThODUCTION: HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA
Homelessness has been a significant and growing problem in America for
over a decade.2 Almost all aspects of the problem-its size, causes, and even
existence-have been the subject of controversy.22 Perhaps because of this,
there has been significant research on homelessness over the past decade.'
Currently, there is a relatively high degree of consensus among social scientists
on many significant points.'
Summarizing the research, this Part provides an overview of contemporary
homelessness in America. First, it discusses the size and nature of the
populaion, noting that despite contrary stereotypes, the homeless population
is in fact demographically diverse. Next, it discusses causes of homelessness;
it notes that any dichotomy between "personal" as opposed to "structural"
analyses does not center on the causes themselves but rather on the origins and
solutions to these causes or, in some cases, on ideology rather than empirical
21. See JENKS, supra note 4, at 9; Wright & Devine, supra note 4, at 320. See generally BURT,
OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4.
22. See generally HUD Report on Homelessness, Joint Hearings Subcomm. on Housing and
Community Development, Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, and Subcom. on Manpower
and Housing, Comm. on Government Operations (1984); see also ELLIOT LIEBOW, TELL THEM WHO
I AM: THE LIVES OF HOMELESS WOMEN 311-14 (1993).
23. E.g., JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1992); BURT,
OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4; MARTHA R. BURT & BARBARA E. COHEN, AMERICA'S HOMELESS:
NUMBERS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND PROGRAMS THAT SERVE THEM (1989); LIEBOW, supra note 22;
JAMES D. WRIGHT, ADDRESS UNKNOWN: THE HOMELESS IN AMERICA (1989); Wright & Devine, supra
note 4; Kim Hopper, Taking the Measure of Homelessness: Recent Research on Scale and Race, 29
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 730 (1995).
24. See infra Section I.A; see also Wright & Devine, supra note 4, at 323 (noting that social
scientists generally agree on numbers of homeless).
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research. Finally, this Part reviews recent remedial responses to homelessness.
A. The Size and Nature of the Homeless Population
Homelessness can be and is defined in a variety of ways.' A common,
narrow, definition is limited to the "literally homeless": those persons who lack
a fixed and regular address and whose primary night-time residence is a public
or private place "not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping
accommodation for human beings," or a shelter or similar facility designed to
provide "temporary living accommodations" for persons with no other
residence.2
Current estimates suggest that on any given night at least 700,000 people
across the country are "literally" homeless.27 More people become homeless
than remain homeless over a year; generally, estimates that extend over time
are substantially larger than "point-in-time" estimates. Currently, over the
course of a year, two to three million people are homeless.' Over a five year
period from 1985 to 1990, seven million people were homeless. About 12
million adults-6.5% of the adult population-have been literally homeless at
some time in their lives.29
Some stereotypes depict homeless people as single, white male alcoholics.
While this characterization may have had a basis in the past,3" the homeless
25. Broad definitions include not only those persons living on the streets or in shelters but also
those who, having no home of their own, are doubled-up with friends or relatives, sometimes constantly
moving among such accommodations; some definitions also include those living in substandard
accommodations. See WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 19-21 (discussing different definitions).
26. This is a narrow version of the definition enunciated by Congress in the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (1995) which arguably also includes persons in inadequate
housing. See also WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 19-23; INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON THE HOMELESS,
PRIORIrY: HOME!: THE FEDERAL PLAN TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF HOMELESSNESS 22-23 (1994)
[hereinafter PRIORITY: HOME!].
27. See Martha R. Burt, Critical Factors in Counting the Homeless, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
334, 335 (1995); Wright & Devine, supra note 4, at 321 (citing W. Tucker, Where Do the Homeless
Come From, 25 NAT. REV. 32, 32-43 (1987), and Congressional Budget Office estimates).
28. Burt, supra note 27, at 336.
29. Bruce Link et al., Lifetime andFive-Year Prevalence ofHomelessness in the United States: New
Evidence on an Old Debate, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 347, 353 (1995). The question of numbers
was highly controversial in the early to mid 1980s. See, e.g., BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4,
at 3-5; JENKS, supra note 4, at 1-2. Estimates ranged from 250,000, see HUD SHELTER REPORT, supra
note 7, at 8; to 2-3 million. See MITCH SNYDER & MARY ELLEN HOMBS, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA:
A FORCED MARCH TO NOwHERE (1982). A limited enumeration in selected areas by the Census Bureau
in 1990 yielded 228,372; however, the Bureau specifically said this number was not a count of the
nation's homeless population. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCE NEWS,
CENSUS BUREAU RELEASES 1990 DECENNIAL COUNTS FOR PERSONS ENUMERATED IN EMERGENCY
SHELTERS AND OBSERVED ON STREETS 2 (Apr. 12, 1991). Currently, there is considerable consensus
among researchers supporting 700,000 as the "point-in-time" estimate and 2-3 million as the annual
estimate. Burt, supra note 27, at 335.
30. See, e.g., Louisa Stark, Blame the System, Not Its Victims, in HOMELESSNESS: CRITICAL ISSUES
FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 7-10 (1987); cf. Hopper, supra note 23, at 734-36 (noting that historically
African-Americans have constituted "substantial minority" overlooked by researchers).
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population is now demographically diverse." According to a recent national
survey, of the total population single men account for 46%, members of
families with children account for 36.5%, single women account for 14%, and
unaccompanied youth account for 3.5%.32 Overall, children make up 25% of
the population.33 Minorities are disproportionately represented: of the
homeless population, about 56% are African-American; 29% white, 12%
Hispanic, 2% Native American, and 1% Asian.34 Of the adult male homeless
population, 30 to 47% are veterans.3
Homeless people are generally extremely poor. Nationally, average monthly
income for homeless people, from any source-including work, public
assistance, and begging-is under $200.36 At any given time, about 20% of
the homeless population is employed full- or part-time;3 7 of those homeless
people living in shelters, about one-third work at some point during a given
week.38 In many cases, employment is through day labor.39 Just over one-
half of homeless adults have completed high school.' Relatively few homeless
people are eligible for or actually receive public assistance benefits: only about
half are enrolled in any kind of benefit program.41
A significant number of homeless people are disabled. About 23 to 30% of
the adult homeless population suffer from severe mental illness.' About half
31. See BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 20; PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 23-25;
WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 72; Kim Hopper & Jill Hamburg, The Making of America's Homeless: From
Skid Row to the New Poor, 1945-1984, in CRITICAL PERSPECrIVES ON HOUSING 12-40 (R.G. Bratt, C.
Hartman, & A. Myerson, eds. 1986).
32. U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 40. This is not a "scientific" study; it is the most
recent national survey, however, and it was conducted by cities, a focus of this Article. More rigorous
studies support these rough breakdowns. It is important to note, however, that the family percentage
refers to members, not households. See BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 12-13.
33. U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 40. The average age of single homeless persons is
in the late thirties; the average age of homeless mothers is in the early thirties. BURT, OVER THE EDGE,
supra note 4, at Table 2-1.
34. U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 40.
35. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 25 (reviewing literature); see WRIGHT, supra note 23, at
63 (stating that 47% of homeless men are veterans).
36. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 24; BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 20, 21.
37. U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 40.
38. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 24.
39. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 66.
40. PRIoRTrrY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 24; BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 17.
41. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 72; see also BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 20 (describing
results of study showing that very few homeless people receive public assistance); NATIONAL LAW
CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, ABANDONED TO THE STREETS: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL
SEcURITY'S PRE-RELEASE PROGRAM 3-4 (1992) (stating that studies show that majority of homeless not
receiving SSI benefits); RICHARD C. TESSLER & DEBORAH L. DENNIS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, A SYNTHESIS OF NIMH-FUNDED RESEARCH CONCERNING PERSONS WHO ARE
HOMELESS AND MENTALLY ILL 20-21 (outlining percentage of homeless who receive SSI or public
assistance in seven major cities).
42. See FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON HOMELESSNESS AND SEERE MENTAL ILLNESS, OUTCASTS ON
MAIN STREET 7-13 (1992) (reporting on mental illness among homeless people in conjunction with other
characteristics such as alcoholism and contact with criminal justice system); PRIORITY: HOME!, supra
note 26, at 24 (stating that up to one third of homeless population is mentally ill); TESSLER & DENNIS,
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of the single adults suffer from past or present alcohol or drug addiction.43
There is some overlap between these groups, with about 23% suffering from
more than one of these conditions; overall, about one-half to two-thirds of
homeless adults suffer from one or more.' About 48 to 80% are seriously
depressed or demoralized, three to five times the national average. 45 About
17% are physically disabled." The average life expectancy for homeless
people is 51.47
Homeless people tend to be socially isolated. Few live with a spouse or
other adult partner.48 About 88% have living relatives,49 but only about 60%
maintain some contact with them; about 24% have no contact with either
friends or relatives.5 0 Many homeless individuals and families double up with
relatives or friends before reaching the streets or shelters; however, the ability
of families to help is limited, at least in part due to lack of resources.
51
Homeless people are not especially mobile. About 70% of homeless people
were born in their current state or have resided in their current city for over
10 years.52 On average, about 50% were born in their current state; the
national average for the general population is about 60%. There is some, but
not much, variation within the country: in "Rustbelt" states, 54% were born
in their current state, in "Sunbelt" states, 45% were born in their current
state.
54
supra note 41, at 29-30 (describing incidence of mental illness among homeless in Los Angeles and
Baltimore); U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 40 (stating that 23% of homeless people are
mentally ill).
43. PRioRrrY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 24 ("At least half of the adult homeless population has a
current or past alcohol or drug abuse problem."); U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 40
("Substance abusers account for 46% of the homeless population.").
44. See JAMES D. WRIGHT & ELEANOR WEBER, HOMELESSNESS AND HEALTH 94 (1987).
45. BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 21.
46. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 111.
47. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 62. Overall, about two-thirds of homeless adults have been in some
institution-mental hospital, chemical dependency in-patient program, prison or jail-at some point in
their lives. See id. at 95-112. In many cases criminal convictions are for activities such as sleeping in
abandoned buildings, in part a result of the trends that are the focus of this Article. See infra Section
II.A.
48. About 18% of women and 9% of men live with a spouse or partner. WRIGHT, supra note 23,
at 68.
49. Id. at 69.
50. Id.
51. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 33 (citing M.J. Stem, Poverty and Family Composition
Since 1940, in THE "UNDERCLASS" DEBATE 220-53 (N.B. Katz ed., 1993)). Significantly, many more
extremely poor people avoid homelessness by relying on family and friends. WRIGHT, supra note 23,
at 72. This group is at a high risk of homelessness and may become homeless when the ability or
willingness of family and friends to help runs out. Id.
52. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 70; see also BLAu, THE VISIBLE POOR, supra note 23, at 28.
53. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 70.
54. Id. However, according to that study, recency of migration varies significantly: 71% of Sunbelt
migrants are recent arrivals, compared to 15 % of Rustbelt migrants, suggesting a higher turnover rate
among Sunbelt migrants. Id.
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B. Causes of Homelessness
In a recent national survey, city officials most frequently identified
unemployment and other employment-related problems as the cause of
homelessness in their city.55 In descending order of frequency, the officials
also identified lack of affordable housing, substance abuse and the lack of
needed services, mental illness, domestic violence, family crisis, and poverty
or insufficient income.56 In general, social scientists agree, identifying similar
"structural" causes of homelessness.Y
The lack of affordable housing, social scientists say, results from both
growing demand and diminishing supply. In 1991, there were eight million
very poor renters, yet only three million units that were affordable to them;
this gap of five million units represents an increase of over four million since
1970.58 Large numbers of inexpensive, private housing units-such as single
room occupancy hotels-were lost to urban renewal: the number of people
living permanently in hotels and rooming houses declined from 640,000 in
1960 to 137,000 in 1990.59 Increases in federal funding for housing assistance
for the poor has also slowed; in 1991 only 25% of those eligible received such
aid.6
Discussing inadequate employment and income, social scientists note that
unemployment can be a first step toward homelessness.6" In the early 1950s,
work force participation for both black and white men aged 16 to 24 was over
70%; in 1985, for the same age group, it was less than 45% for black males
and about 65% for white males.62 The declining real value of the minimum
55. U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 45.
56. Id. at 45-46.
57. See generally BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4 (emphasizingjoblessness, lack of affordable
housing, and changes in income support programs); PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26 (discussing
poverty, changes in labor market, lack of income assistance and lack of affordable housing); PETER H.
RossI, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNEs (1989); WRIGHT, supra note 23
(outlining causes ranging from lack of affordable housing to disabilities and unemployment); Hopper,
supra note 23.
58. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 28 (citation omitted). As used here, "very poor" refers
to the poorest one-fourth of renters. "Affordable" refers to the standard established by HUD that rent
be no more than 30% of income. Id.
59. Id. at 28 (citing CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL PoUcY (1992)).
60. Id. at 29. The decline is reflected in the rate of increase in new units, not in absolute numbers.
For example, from 1977 to 1984, an average of 219,000 additional poor households were assisted each
year. But from 1985 to 1991, the average annual increase was just 61,285. Id. (citing HOUSE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102ND CONG. 1sT SFSs., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 1991
GREENBOOK (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter 1991 GREENBOOK]).
61. BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 72 (referring to study of homeless men); see also
BLAu, supra note 23, at 36-47 (discussing economic causes of homelessness).
62. BLAU, supra note 23, at 36-47. "Work force participation" refers to percentage of those
employed, as opposed to unemployment statistics, which do not include "discouraged" workers who are
no longer actively looking for work.
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wage is also cited as a cause of homelessness. 63 At the same time, the real
value of income assistance benefits has declined: from 1970 to 1992 median
monthly benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children dropped from
$799 to $435 (in 1992 dollars).' For single people, less aid is available.
Unemployment benefits are time-limited,' income assistance programs for
single individuals were cut and in some cases eliminated in the 1980s and early
1990s, affecting over a third of recipients nationwide.6 Currently, only eight
states provide any assistance to single poor persons. 67
Lack of care for the indigent mentally ill has also been cited as a causal
factor. Between 1955 and 1980 state mental hospital beds were reduced from
559,000 to 150,000; most of the reduction occurred between 1963 (504,000
beds) and 1974 (216,000 beds).' According to many analysts, the failure to
replace state mental hospitals with community mental health care for the
mentally ill indigent-rather than deinstitutionalization itself-is a cause of
homelessness. 69 In addition, disability payments under the Social Security
Act-which aid both the physically and mentally disabled-were significantly
curtailed in the early 1980s; at least some former recipients subsequently
became homeless."
Finally, extreme poverty is identified by social scientists as an underlying
common denominator. Beginning in 1980, the proportion and numbers of poor
and extremely poor people increased significantly. In 1983 the poverty rate was
15.2%, higher than at any time since 1966.71 From 1989 to 1992, the poverty
63. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 27; BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 196.
64. Id. (citing 1991 GREENBOOK, supra note 60). In 1992, the combined value of AFDC benefits
and food stamps brought a family of four to about two-thirds of the poverty level. Id. Some argue that
the poverty level does not take account of other non-cash benefits for which such a family may be
eligible. See, e.g., Heritage Foundation, How the PoorReally Live, in BACKGROUNDER No. 875, at 3
(Jan. 31, 1992); Dana Milbank, Old Flaws Undermine New Poverty Level Data, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5,
1995, at Bi. However, many eligible families do not receive these benefits. See PRIORITY: HOME!,
supra note 26, at 29 (only 25% of those eligible actually receive housing aid, the largest such benefit);
see also MICHAEL TANNER ET AL., CATO INSIITUE: THE WORK VERSUS WELFARE TRADE-OFF: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL LEVEL OF WELFARE BENEFITS BY STATE 28 (1995). In addition, the poverty
level is based on a standard created in the 1950s that understates what would be currently be considered
a minimum subsistence level. See, e.g., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES & FAMILY USA
FOUNDATION, REAL LIFE POVERTY IN AMERICA: WHERE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD SET THE
POVERTY LINE viii (1990).
65. Id. In 1990, such benefits reached a smaller number of those eligible than at any time in the
previous 20 years. PRIORrrY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 28.
66. Id.
67. MARION NICHOLS & KATHRYN PORTER, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: GAPS IN THE SAFETY NET 13-14 (1995); telephone interview by
Laurel Weir, Policy Director, National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, with Marion Nichols,
Senior Research Analyst, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Apr. 1, 1996). The eight states are
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Utah. Id.
68. BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 121.
69. Id. (citations omitted).
70. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELESSNESS: A COMPLEX PROBLEM AND T1HE
FEDERAL RESPONSE 23-24 (1985) [hereinafter GAO HOMELESSNESS REPORT].
71. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 38.
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population increased by 5 million; of that number, 3 million had incomes less
than 50% of the poverty threshold. 72 In 1994, a total of 38.1 million Ameri-
cans were poor, 5.6 million more than in 1989; about 15 million were
extremely poor, with incomes under 50% of the poverty line.73 Of the
extremely poor, as many as one in ten become homeless. 74
Some analysts identify mental illness and drug and alcohol addiction as the
primary causes of homelessness, describing them as "personal" problems and
placing them in opposition to "structural" causes such as lack of affordable
housing, poverty, and declining social benefits.75 Some commentators have
interpreted this analysis to mean that homelessness is actually a personal
choice, as opposed to a societal phenomenon that is at least partially externally
determined. 76  Nevertheless, primary recent proponents of this analysis
disavow the view that homeless people "choose to live this way" or are "lazy,
shiftless bums."' Further, despite their emphasis on the "personal," they also
note the importance of factors generally considered structural, such as the
"gentrification" of inexpensive housing, as well as the "gentrification" of
addictions treatment, which they say has dramatically reduced treatment for
indigent addicts.78
Similarly, other traditionally "conservative" analysts have not generally
questioned the relevance of housing, employment, and mental health care as
underlying causes. Rather, such analysts differ from others in their view of the
origins of and solutions to these causes. For example, some argue that rent
control laws create housing shortages which in turn lead to homelessness;79
72. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 26.
73. Commerce Department, Bureau of the Census, Income, Poverty, and Valuation of Noncash
Benefits: 1994, Table 9 (forthcoming 1996); see also BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 46-48
(discussing Michael Stone's concept of "shelter poverty," the burden placed on poor when significant
portion of their income is spent on housing); MARY ELLEN HOMBS, A CONTINUUM OF VIOLENCE:
RETHINKING ADVOCACY PRIORITIES IN HOMELESSNESS 3,5 (1994); U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note
4, at 45.
74. Rossl, supra note 57, at 77. Rossi defines extreme poverty as 75% or less than the poverty
threshold. Id. at 13; see also BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 57-58.
75. E.g., ALICE S. BAUM & DONALD W. BURNES, A NATION IN DENIAL 153 (1993).
76. E.g., Richard Cohen, Forced Shelter, WASH. Posr, Dec. 8, 1993, atA23, Andrew P. Thomas,
The Rise and Fall of the Homeless, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Apr. 8, 1996, at 27; see also Heather
MacDonald, Real Roots of Homelessness, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A16.
77. Id. at 155. Baum and Burnes cite somewhat higher figures for these conditions than most social
scientists, stating that 65 to 85% of homeless adults suffer from mental illness or substance abuse. Id.
at 29. But see WRIGHT & WEBER, supra note 44, at 94.
78. BAUM & BURNES, supra note 75, at 159-62. Baum and Burnes also point to what they call
"disinstitutionalization"-the loss of capacity in institutions and consequent failure to institutionalize
persons who might otherwise be institutionalized. Id. at 162.
79. E.g., William Tucker, Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, in RETHINKING POLICY ON
HOMELESSNESS 33-39 (1989); see also Carl Horowitz, Washington's Continuing Fiction: A National
Housing Shortage, in HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER 14, 16 (1990) (arguing that contrary to
claims by "special interests" including the real estate industry and the homeless "lobby," there is no
"national housing shortage," but acknowledging shortages of affordable housing in certain parts of the
country due to overly strict building and zoning codes; and recommending reducing regulation, and
providing housing "vouchers" and increased job opportunities to the poor). Another analyst argues that
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others fault cities for using federal funds to destroy, without replacing, low-
cost housing, and for failing to provide community-based mental health care
to formerly institutionalized persons.'
Finally, some commentators state that homelessness is a "choice," and that
homeless people simply prefer living outdoors as a "lifestyle"; this appears to
be a view espoused by some politicians and pundits, as opposed to social
scientists or others who have studied the issue."1 Similarly, some commenta-
tors question whether the non-homeless should take any responsibility for
addressing homelessness, and suggest that it is up to homeless people
themselves to address their plight.' While sometimes stated in terms of causal
theories, such views speak more to solutions: what should be done and who
should do it.' Insofar as they make statements about causation-such as
attributing homelessness in general to "choice"-they do not appear to be based
on any empirical evidence. 84
Currently, despite this range of causes, there appears to be a relatively high
degree of consensus among social scientists.' In some cases there may be
different emphasis on the relative significance of the various causes; however,
even this difference diminishes when distinctions between levels of causation
are made. 6 In general, "structural" causes-such as insufficient housing
policies that provide preferences for subsidized housing to shelter residents contribute to homelessness
by providing an incentive to those living doubled-up or in otherwise illegal or inadequate housing to
leave that housing, become homeless, and seek space in shelters. See, e.g., JENKS, supra note 4, at 104.
This analysis also acknowledges that a shortage of affordable housing is a factor in causing
homelessness.
80. Stuart M. Butler, Remarks at the Heritage Foundation, in THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
RETHINKING POLICY ON HOMELESSNESS 61-65 (1988); see also Anna Kondratas, Remarks at the
Heritage Foundation, in RETHINKING POLICY ON HOMELESSNESS, supra, at 56-61 (stating that many
homeless people may need ongoing support services).
81. See, e.g., M. Engel &E. Sargent. Meese's HungerRemarks StirMore OutrageAmong Groups,
WASH. POsr, Dec. 11, 1983, at Al; S. Roberts, Reagan on Homeless: Some Choose to Live in the
Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1988, at Al; Interview with Mayor Bruce Tartt of Austin, TX (BBC
radio broadcast, Dec. 27, 1995); Craig Knight et al., The Real Homeless, G.W. HATCHET, Jan. 31,
1994, at 4; Cohen, supra note 76, at A23.
82. E.g., PBS Special, Am I My Brother's Keeper (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 21, 1995);
Editorial, The Homeless Who Reject Help, TAMPA TRB., June 1, 1993. PAGE #S??
83. For example, some commentators state, often in the context of the larger debate about "welfare
reform," that homelessness should be addressed by individuals, families, churches, and charities
reaching out to individual homeless people. E.g., Arianna Huffington, Why Charities Should First of
All be Charitable, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at A21.
84. This is not to say that no homeless people choose to be homeless; a few may, but the evidence
clearly is that the vast majority do not. Further, with regard to those who are mentally ill, the question
of "choice" may have little-or at least different-meaning, a point that proponents of the "choice"
theory presumably would accept.
85. See, e.g., PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 25-26 (summarizing causes to include all of
those listed above-except "personal choice"-and also distinguishing between "structural causes" and
"risk factors").
86. For example, Burt describes poverty as a "risk factor" rather than a "cause" of homelessness;
she considers low-paying jobs, high living costs, and tight housing markets to be factors that cause poor
people to become homeless. BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 198 (noting that high poverty rates
and high homelessness rates alone do not correlate). Wright summarizes the cause of homelessness as
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affordable by the poor, poverty, unemployment, insufficient income assistance,
and insufficient treatment facilities-determine that some number of the poor
will become homeless.87  Specific "personal" characteristics-such as
disabilities, substance abuse, and social isolation-place individuals at risk for
being members of that group.88 In neither case, however, can homelessness
be considered a choice.
C. Societal Response to Homelessness
To date, the primary societal response to homelessness has been emergency
relief: shelters and soup kitchens. In the early 1980s, local groups began
responding to the growing need with emergency aid. 9 Beginning in 1983,
some federal funds were appropriated through the federal disaster relief agency
to fund local government and private groups to provide emergency aid.90 In
1987, more comprehensive federal aid was provided; however, most of the
funding was for emergency shelter, and has been sufficient to meet only a
fraction of the need. 91 Nationwide, cities regularly report that they are unable
to meet the need even for emergency food and shelter.' A recent survey of
29 large cities across the country found that on average 19% of the need for
emergency shelter went unmet in the cities over the past year due to lack of
resources.93 The survey also found that on average 15% of requests for
emergency food assistance went unmet over the past year due to lack of
too many poor people competing for too little affordable housing. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 37-38. He
also notes that the lack of sufficient affordable housing is not always the "proximate" cause of
homelessness but it is the "ultimate" cause of homelessness in all cases. Id. at 38.
87. E.g., WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 37-38; BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 198.
88. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra-note 26, at 25-36; WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 50. Wright cautions
against conflating the characteristics of homeless people-high proportions of mental illness, drug and
alcohol use-with the causes of homelessness-fundamentally, an imbalance between the availability of
affordable housing and poor people in need of it. He argues that the causes dictate that some people will
become homeless, and the characteristics make it likely that those particular people will become
homeless. Id.
89. PRIORITY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 39.
90. Id. at 39; GAO HOMELEssNESs REPORT, supra note 70, at iii-iv. The funds, appropriated but
not authorized, were funneled through the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA), the agency
responsible for assisting victims of disasters such as hurricanes and floods.
91. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11301 (West 1995). While the
Act was comprehensive in the scope of needs it addressed, most of the funding was for emergency
shelter. Moreover, while its funding has been increased, compare Supplemental Appropriation Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-7, 101 Stat. 391 (1987) (appropriating $325 million for FY 1987), with Pub.
L. No. 103-33, 108 Stat. 2589 et seq. (1994), the emergency aid the McKinney Act provides remains
severely inadequate to the need: in one recent funding cycle, nearly 3000 proposals for transitional
housing projects were submitted but only 818 could be funded under the Act. See DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FACT SHEET: 1995 HOMELESS ASSISTANCE COMPEITION
RESULTS (1995). For a detailed review of the Act, see Maria Foscarinis, The Federal Role: The Stewart
B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (book chapter) (forthcoming 1996); Maria Foscarinis, Shelter
and Housing: Programs Under the Stewart B. McKinney Homelessness Assistance Act, 29 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 760 (1995); see also Foscarinis, supra note 18.
92. See, e.g., U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (citing 11 annual surveys).
93. U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 58.
Homelessness and Its Criminalization
resources.' These figures are likely conservative. 95
The most recent national estimate is that there are approximately 275,000
shelter spaces available across the country; this includes not only beds but also
floor and chair space.' About one-third of these facilities require their
residents to leave during the day; many also do not permit persons to leave
their belongings there. 9 Some shelters charge fees, generally ranging from
$3 to $10 per night.98 While they sometimes offer food and donated clothing,
shelters typically do not provide cash assistance which may be necessary for
transportation, telephone calls, and toiletries. 99 In some cities there are
daytime "drop-in" or "warming" centers where homeless people may sit, use
the bathroom and sometimes bathe; nationally, there are few such facili-
ties. 1"o Access to public toilets and bathing facilities is generally very limit-
ed.101
In many cities, the discrepancy between need and resources is extremely
high, based on the cities' own estimates. For example, in Atlanta, there are
15,000 to 22,000 people homeless on any given night, and a maximum of 2700
beds for them."~c In Dallas, 3500 to 5000 people are homeless on any given
night, and a maximum of 1729 shelter beds are available. °3 In Los Angeles,
there are 42,000 to 77,000 people homeless on any given night and a maximum
of 8300 beds available." In Aurora, Colorado, there are approximately 1350
94. Id. at 1.
95. See Wright & Devine, supra note 4, at 323 (estimating at least same number and up to ten
times as many unsheltered as sheltered). In addition, not all shelter spaces are available to all homeless
people: for example, many do not shelter whole families. See NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON
HOMELESSNES AND POVERTY, No WAY OUT 1-2 (1993) [hereinafter No WAY OuT]; U.S.C.M. 1995
REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. Some do not serve mentally ill or chemically dependent people. See HUD
SHELTER REPORT, supra note 7, at 41.
96. PRIORrrY: HOME!, supra note 26, at 40.
97. HUD SHELTER REPORT, supra note 7, at 38.
98. Id.; see also Sherry Jacobson, Homeless Enclaves Targeted: City to Remove Encampments,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 16, 1993, at A27. If current trends continue, more are likely to do so
in the future, and the amounts may be substantial.
99. HUD SHELTER REPORT, supra note 7, at 38. Transportation may be necessary to gain access
to services, which are often scattered across cities; it may be especially necessary for children, the
elderly and the ill. See also NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, A FOOT IN THE
SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR 15 (1995) [hereinafter A FOOT IN THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR] (outining special
transportation needs for homeless school children).
100. See, e.g., U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
101. See, e.g., Ann Hagedorn & Wayne Green, Advocacy Group Sues New York, Citing Lack of
Public Restrooms, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1990, at B8.
102. No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 55 (citing STATE OF GEORGIA
COMPREHENSIvE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY STRATEGY 50 (1994)). Number of beds includes emergency
and "transitional" beds; 500 are winter beds, bringing the number down to 2,200 in summer. Id. These
numbers do not include battered women's shelters, youth only shelters or facilities for the mentally ill.
Id. at 55 n.224.
103. Id. at8O (citing CITY OF DALLAS, TEx. COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING AFFORDABILTY STRATEGY
29 (1994)). These beds are emergency shelter beds; there is also transitional housing for 69 families.
Id.
104. Id. at 14-15. These are figures for Los Angeles County; beds include 1500 winter beds.
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people homeless on any given night and 65 emergency shelter beds."°3
The discrepancy between need and emergency aid means that each night,
at least 425,000 people have nowhere to sleep except in public places, and that
each day at least 700,000 people-at least-have nowhere to be save public
places."° At the very minimum, this means that they must perform essential
bodily functions-such as sleeping, eating, bathing, urinating and defecat-
ing-in public. Some must also beg for spare change"07 to obtain essential
survival resources,108 or to secure funds to pay the fees charged by some
shelters, or to pay for transportation or food.'0 9
Resources that could provide long-term solutions to homelessness are in
short supply as well. In a 1995 survey of twenty-nine cities, 73% of the cities
reported that requests for assisted housing by low income families and
individuals increased over the past year; no city reported a decrease."'
Average waits for such housing ranged from 17 to 39 months, depending on
the type of assistance;" 71% of cities reported that they have closed their
waiting list for at least one type of assistance because the waiting periods were
so long."2 On the private market housing is also unaffordable by many: In
a 1994 survey of 49 cities, in no city were minimum wage earnings sufficient
105. No ROOM FOR THE INN, supra note 12, at 35 (citing CITY OF AURORA, COLORADO
COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY STRATEGY 28, 42 (1994)).
106. Some commentators argue that shelters are not always full, and that homeless people therefore
"choose" to sleep outdoors. However, many shelters have eligibility requirements that many homeless
people cannot meet, accounting for some or all vacancies. See generally HUD SHELTER REPORT, supra
note 7. Some shelters, particularly large ones, may be dangerous. See generally HOMMS, supra note 73
(describing violent situation in many shelters). Some people may be mentally ill and unable to make a
meaningful choice. Finally, some may indeed choose to retain some independence on the streets over
shelters that require a nightly request for a bed and departure in the morning; this may be especially true
for those with few or no realistic prospects of moving into any form of housing.
107. See BURT, OVER THE EDGE, supra note 4, at 44, which cites data ranging from 44%
(homeless men categorized as "other"-neither single nor with children) to 8% (homeless women with
children) (national data based on interviews with homeless people who uses services-shelters or soup
kitchens-non-service users not included). Id. at 12.
108. Providers of emergency shelter and food are unable fully to meet the need, see U.C.S.M.
1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. The larger context-especially unemployment and low or no public
assistance-also indicates that some significant number of people are resorting to begging as a means
of securing some income. See infra Part V.
109. Some beggars may use change collected for alcohol or drugs; some may be mentally ill and
otherwise use money received improperly or ineffectively. However, indigent addicts and mentally ill
persons also have survival needs for shelter and food, and these may be particularly great. In the
absence of treatment services and to the extent that alcoholism and drug abuse are addictions that cannot
be controlled without treatment, an indigent addict without access to treatment may have no alternative
but to beg. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), and discussion of addictions, infra Subsection
IH.B.2.b. Increasingly, shelters are imposing rules that exclude people who are mentally ill or who are
chemically dependent. Finally, some note that not all beggars are homeless. E.g., Ellickson, supra note
20, at 1191-93. However, beggars who are also addicts are also most likely impoverished, even if not
homeless.
110. U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 77-82.
111. Id. at 77-78. The walt averaged 17 months for public housing, 39 months for Section 8
vouchers, and 40 months for Section 8 Certificates. Id. at 78.
112. Id. at79.
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to afford a one-bedroom apartment, under federal guidelines."' In no city
were income assistance payments for families-or for individuals, where such
programs existed-sufficient to afford such housing.11 4 In no city were
combined federal and state disability payments sufficient." 5 Moreover, in a
1993 survey of 16 cities, no city for which information was available had
sufficient mental health treatment services for the poor. 116
The absence of longer-term aid provides few options for homeless people
to move off the streets or out of emergency shelters. In addition, homelessness
itself creates additional barriers to long-term aid: without a permanent address,
telephone, and transportation, finding housing and employment, for example,
is extremely difficult." 7 Without a quiet place to sleep, a place to wash, and
clean clothes, maintaining employment is extremely difficult.118 Without an
address, it may also be difficult or impossible to apply for and receive public
assistance benefits; this is especially true for those who are disabled.1 19
Homelessness may also create or exacerbate physical or mental disabilities,
further compounding these difficulties. Overall, at any given time, the
options for a homeless person to escape homelessness are extremely limited;
the immediate options for doing so are virtually non-existent. 121
The dearth of significant steps to prevent homelessness or address its causes
has led to its persistence and rise. As a result, for more than a decade, at any
given time significant numbers of people have lived in public places, in a very
visible and extreme state of destitution and despair. With the passage of time,
homeless people can become increasingly marginalized and isolated. At least
113. No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at Table 11. In fact, such earnings exceeded
the fair market rent, as determined by the federal government, in only two cities, New York and San
Francisco. Id.
114. Id.; see also NO WAY OUT, supra note 95, at Table I (describing 1993 study indicating that
in 19 cities income assistance programs were insufficient for affordable housing).
115. NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at Table HI.
116. RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9 (providing information for nine cities); see also
U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 4 (listing sixteen cities that identified mental illness and lack
of needed services as a main cause of homelessness). The percentage of need met ranged from 41% (Las
Vegas and Reno) to 1% (Washington, D.C.). RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 88-98,
116-25.
117. See WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 115-24; LIEBOW, supra note 22, at 51-59.
118. See, e.g., LIEBOW, supra note 22, at 51-59.
119. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 117. Moreover, typically documents such as social security cards,
tax records or doctors' reports are required. Literacy skills and mental capacity may be needed to fill
out forms. Many homeless people are not literate and mentally disabled homeless people-eligible for
SSI because of their disability-are unlikely to be able to complete the 15 page application form
unassisted. See also Susan Bennett, "No Relief But Upon Coming Into the House"-Controlled Spaces,
Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157 (1995).
120. See, e.g., Hopper, supra note 23, at 731; WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 95.
121. People do in fact escape homelessness. E.g., WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 73. But on any given
night a homeless person has virtually no immediate chance of doing so; the chance that is available
requires time, and is also extremely limited. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 91-94 (lack of
housing assistance); see also ROSSI, supra note 57; WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 73 (many leave
homelessness only to soon return, because of continued extreme poverty).
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in part, the failure to address homelessness in an adequate manner in the 1980s
has made its criminalization possible in the 1990s.
II. "ANTI-HOMELESS" CITY AcrIoNs: AN OVERVIEW
Since 1991, the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty has
conducted three surveys of city laws and policies that criminalize activities
associated with homelessness. 12 The most comprehensive survey, conducted
in 1994," found that 42 of the cities examined took actions directed against
their homeless residents."2 While no hard data are available, and the surveys
cannot be considered "scientific," indications are that such actions are rapidly
rising nationally."z This Part presents an overview of three major types of
C rminalizing city actions. It then reviews some purposes of these actions, and
their effects.
A. Forms of Criminalization
City actions directed against homeless people can be divided into several
major categories. Some city actions regulate or restrict their presence in public
places. Others restrict or regulate their solicitation of money or other aid."
In addition to direct restrictions on homeless people, some cities place
restrictions on organizations or individuals providing aid or services to
homeless people. In practice, these distinctions blur, as different types of
actions are often used in combination.
1. Public Place Restrictions
Perhaps the most severe public place restrictions are city efforts to prohibit
122. See No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9; RIGHTTO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note
9; Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 9. The current trend reflects and continues much older ones. See
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 (1972); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity, 66
TULANE L. REv. 631,650 (1992) ("With the invalidation of vagrancy and loitering laws, officials have
turned to arrest campaigns against sleeping in public to punish and control the displaced poor.").
123. No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9. The report examined 49 cities across the
country in which some action addressing the presence or activities of homeless people in public areas
was known to have been taken.
124. Id. at i.
125. NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 4; RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra
note 9, at ii. Seven of the 49 cities in the 1994 survey adopted alternatives to criminalization; six
adopted both approaches. No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at i. In 1995 the National
Law Center conducted another survey, using similar methodology, and identified 30 cities that initiated
additional punitive measures in 1995, not including continuations of the policies engaged in during 1994.
No ROOM FOR THE INN, supra note 12, at Table 1 (1995). Some of the 42 cities identified in the 1994
report also continued their activities into 1995. Id.
126. In some cases, the line between these categories is blurring. See, e.g., Patton v. City of
Baltimore, Civ. No. S-93-2389 (D.Md. Aug. 19, 1994); see also District of Columbia, Panhandling
Control Congressional Recess Emergency Act of 1993 (Aug. 4, 1993), amending D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3306 (1989); Seattle, Wash. Ordinance 113697 (Oct. 19, 1987), adding SEATrLE MUN. CODE ch.
12A.12.015 (1987).
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the mere presence of homeless people in the city. These include efforts
physically to transport homeless people out of the city. For example, a Dallas
City Councilmember proposed giving homeless people bus tickets out of
town; 2 in Cleveland and Huntsville, Alabama, police have driven homeless
people to city limits and left them there."r
Similarly broad are ordinances that prohibit sleeping in all public
places.129 For example, the Dallas city code makes it a crime to "sleepI or
dozeD in a street, alley, park, or other public place." Similar to these are
ordinances that prohibit "camping" in any public area, where "camping" is
defined to include using a sleeping bag or occupying a temporary shelter; 130
as are those that prohibit "lodging" or "us[ing] any public space or public
street for living accommodations.""' Many cities prohibit urinating or
defecating in public; 3  some prohibit public bathing.'
Facially narrower ordinances impose restrictions at certain locations or
times or both. Some prohibit "camping" in certain areas." Many cities close
127. See Jonathan Eig, Homeless Eviction May Take Effect Soon, City Unsure Where to Send up
to 200, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 11, 1993, at 13A.
128. Church v. Huntsville, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401, at *2, (N.D. Ala. Sept.
23, 1993). Similar events have occurred in Cleveland, see Clements v. City of Cleveland, 1:94 CV 2074
(1994); 4Homeless Men Sue Cleveland, AP, Oct. 5, 1994; Paul Shepard, Advocates Say Cleveland Hard
on Homeless, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 16, 1994, at4B; and Seattle, see Michael Paulson, GoingforBroke
on Panhandling, City Attorney Seeks Clampdown on 'Misbehavior on the Streets', SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, May 20, 1993, at BI (quoting Seattle Mayor's statement that law is intended to give
aggressive panhandlers the message that "they probably ought to move out of town.").
129. DALLAS, TEX. CITY CODE § 31-13 (a)(1) (1992). A Beverly Hills ordinance prohibits sitting,
lying or sleeping in any public place; it provides exceptions for persons who must sit because of a
physical disability, who are "viewing a legally conducted parade," and who are "seated on a bench
lawfully installed for such purpose." Beverly Hills, Cal., City Ordinance 93-0-2165 (1993) amending
BEVERLY HILLS, CAL. CITY CODE art. 13 § 5.6.1303 (1993).
130. For example, a 1992 Santa Ana, California, ordinance makes it "unlawful for any person to
camp, occupy camp facilities, or use camp paraphernalia in... (a) any street; (b) any public parking
lot or public area, improved or unimproved." Santa Ana, Cal., Ordinance NS-2160 (Apr. 3, 1992),
amending SANTA ANA, CAL. CITY CODE § 10-402 (1992). "Camp facilities" and "camp paraphernalia"
are defined to include "temporary shelters," "tarpaulins, cots, beds, sleeping bags, hammocks or non-
city designated cooking facilities and similar equipment." Id. at § 10-401 (b), (c). The ordinance also
makes it unlawful to "store personal property" in any public area. Id. at § 10-403.
131. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 1988) (defining lodging as "any building, structure,
vehicle"; Santa Monica, Cal., Ordinance 1620 (Apr. 14, 1992), adding SANTA ANA, CAL. CITY CODE
§ 4202B (a) (prohibiting using public areas as living accommodations "except in areas specifically
designated for such use").
132. See, e.g., Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Pottinger v.
City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Church v. Huntsville, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S,
1993 WL 646401 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993),preliminary injunction vacated, 30 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir.
1994); SEATrLE, WASH. MUN. CODE 12A.10.100 (1993) (creating crime of "repeatedly urinating or
defecating in public"); see also NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 80 n.80 (describing
similar ordinance in Chester County, Pennsylvania); Hagedorne & Green, supra note 101.
133. See, e.g., RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 79.
134. For example, a Santa Ana ordinance prohibits "camping" in the Civic Center area. Santa Ana,
Cal. Ordinance NS-2210 (Dec. 20, 1993) amending SANTA ANA, CAL. CITY CODE § 10-550 (b), (d)
(1992). The ordinance provides an exemption for "[s]hort-time, casual sleeping which does not occur
in the context of using the Civic Center for living accommodations." Id. at § 10-550 (a), (e).
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parks or prohibit sleeping or "camping" in them at night;135 others close or
prohibit sleeping on beaches at night. 136 A Reno, Nevada ordinance prohibits
remaining in parks for more than four hours; 137 an Atlanta ordinance places
restrictions on "remain[ing]" on a parking lot. 138 Many prohibit loitering
within a defined distance of an ATM. 3 9 A Seattle ordinance prohibits lying
or sitting on sidewalks in downtown and neighborhood commercial areas from
7 a.m. to 9 p.m.140
In several cities restrictions are aimed at homeless people living in public
transportation systems and areas. For example, Seattle posts "no trespassing"
signs in bus shelters and arrests homeless people who use them under the
state's trespassing laws.14' In San Francisco, state codes prohibiting loitering
at public transportation stations have been used to cite homeless people and
require them to move on. 2 In New York City, transit authority rules
prohibit begging on subway trains; 43 in the New York-New Jersey Port
Authority homeless people have been ordered to move on and treated roughly
as part of an effort to remove them from the station." Some cities have
initiated special efforts to remove homeless people from airports. 45
135. See, e.g., Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843; Tobe v. Santa Ana, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded, 272 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994),judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d
1145 (Cal. 1995); 36 C.F.R. § 7.96 (i) (1992); RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 110-11
(Seattle); id. at 100-01 (New York City).
136. See, e.g., Santa Monica Cal., Ordinance 1738 (Apr. 26, 1994), amending SANTA MONICA,
CAL. MUN. CODE § 4.08.090; see also RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 76-77 (discussing
Key West ordinance).
137. For example, a New York City park rule titled "storage of materials" prohibits using a park
bench "so as to interfere with its use by other people." N.Y.C. PARKS AND RECREATION RuLEs, Article
iii, § 19 (1984).
138. Atlanta, Ga. Ordinance to Amend Part 17 of the Code of Ordinances (July 17, 1991) adding
§ 17-1007 (prohibiting remaining on lot unless person has a vehicle parked on it, is an employee, or has
"other lawful business" on it).
139. NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 33 (documenting that San Francisco
ordinance prohibited loitering within 30 feet of an ATM); see also Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.
Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
140. Seattle, Wash. Ordinance Forbidding Sitting or Lying Down on Public Sidewalks, adding
§ 15.48.040 (1993). Trespass laws are also used to keep homeless people out of certain areas at certain
times; Dallas used the trespass laws to ban people from downtown areas from midnight to 5 a.m. in July
1994. Jonathan Eig, No Trespassing Signs Posted, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 8, 1994, at 25A, cited
in No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 32.
Nuisance laws have also been used in Huntington Beach, California, see NO HOMELESS PEOPLE
ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 82, San Francisco, see NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9. at
32; and Santa Cruz, see Santa Cruz, Cal. Ordinance No. 94-11 (1994) amaending SANTA CRUZ, CAL.
CITY CODE § 636.040 (1994) (declaring any campsite within the city to be a public nuisance subject to
immediate removal).
141. RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 115.
142. Id. at 45.
143. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
144. See Streetwatch v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
145. See RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 65 (describing Chicago's airport relocation
program. Cities also regulate use of vacant buildings, see, e.g., ATLANTA, GA. CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 17-1006 (1991) (making it unlawful "for any person to enter or to remain in a vacant or unoccupied
building"), as well as public buildings. See, e.g., NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at
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In addition to enacting new laws, cities also enforce existing but often
unenforced laws-such as prohibitions on loitering, littering, jaywalking, and
carrying open containers-selectively against homeless people. 14 Selective
enforcement is used to conduct regular "sweeps" to remove homeless people
from certain areas of a city, such as downtown business or tourist areas; 147
it may be part of a city effort to "clean up" in preparation for a particular
event. '4 Cities may also take actions before private events held by major
businesses.'4 9 Selective enforcement may be used to arrest people, to order
them to "move on," or to remove them from encampments.
150
Some cities proceed without any underlying law. 5' For example, in
Huntsville, Alabama, as described by a federal judge, homeless people were
"harassed" for "simply walking or congregating in certain sections of the
City," and "ordered out of city parks by city employees and told not to return,
79-80 (describing Chester County, Pennsylvania ordinance that prohibits loitering on county property
or in county buildings); RIGHT To REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 93 & n.347 (describing Las
Vegas, Nevada library board policy that prohibits bringing personal belongings "such as sleeping rolls
or luggage" into library).
146. E.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994); see also No HOMELESS
PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 80-84 (Dallas); RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 30-
32 (San Diego); id. at 55-56 (Atlanta); id. at 25-27 (Santa Ana).
147. See RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 101 (describing New York City's removal
of homeless in Manhattan); id. at 28-29 (discussing Atlanta's effort to create downtown "hospitality
zone").
148. See NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at5l, 53 (describing how Miami officials
bulldozed shantytown in preparation for Miami Grand Prix). Dallas selectively enforced criminal
trespass, public sleeping, and panhandling laws before and in areas surrounding the site of the World
Cup. Gilbert Jimenez, City Hiding Homeless For Cup, Advocates Say, CHI. SuN-TImms, Jun. 15, 1994,
at 4. New York City "swept" the areas surrounding the site of the Democratic Convention in 1992,
directing homeless people to City "service centers" set up for this purpose. RIGHT TO REMAIN
NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 101. Atlanta has increased enforcement of a variety of ordinances against
homeless people; local advocates report that this is preparation for the 1996 Olympic games. Id. at 29.
149. See No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 85-86 (reporting events of Houston
city council meeting where removal of homeless encampment was ordered after complaints by local
business).
150. E.g., RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 100-02 (demonstrating how New York
selectively uses laws to remove homeless people from parks, subway stations or to justify seizure of
property); id. at 77-79 (describing Miami's arrest of homeless through select use of park closing and
loitering laws); id. at 111 (reporting Seattle's use of park regulations to force homeless to "move
along").
151. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (quoting police
memorandum noting that homeless people were "not violating any laws," and decision to order a
"permanent watch" on area and encourage merchants to call with any violations they observed); see also
RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 31-32 (describing how homeless are simply arrested with
reason to be determined later); No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 25 (stating that city
of Santa Ana would simply throw out homeless people's belongings). In San Francisco, the city
developed a policy to make San Francisco "inhospitable to homeless people." Brief for the National Law
Center on Homelessness & Poverty, et al. as Amicus Curiae at 3, Joyce v. City of San Francisco (9th
Cir. 1995) (No. 95-16940) (citation omitted). The Mayor's office then instructed the police department
and city attorney's office to develop a list of laws under which homeless people could be arrested. Id.
at 7.
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even though they were not violating any laws at the time.""5 Some homeless
persons were detained and taken out of the city by police, and then aban-
doned. 153
2. Restrictions on Begging
Some cities impose broad bans on begging. For example, a Chicago law
prohibits the "solicitation of alms" in public. 54 Other broad bans include
begging within other prohibitions: for example, some laws define "disorderly
conduct" to include being "idle, dissolute or found begging"; 55 others
prohibit "loiter[ing] ... with the intent to ... solicit[."156 Some ordinances
prohibit "solicitation" generally. 57 The trend, however, is away from broad
bans in favor of prohibitions that are more narrowly fashioned, in various
degrees and ways.'
58
Narrower prohibitions apply in defined places or times. For example,
some laws prohibit begging on subways 5 9 or near automated teller ma-
chines;' o some prohibit solicitation of occupants of motor vehicles.' 6'
Some are extremely detailed in describing the area of their prohibition. For
example, a Santa Cruz ordinance prohibits solicitation of donations within ten
feet of a street comer or sidewalk cafe, six feet of a building entrance,
window, crosswalk, kiosk or vending cart, four feet of a drinking fountain,
152. Church v. Huntsville, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Sept.
23, 1993), preliminary injunction vacated, 30 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1994); see also No HOMELESS
PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at77 (describing alleged Cleveland policy of driving homeless to city
limits and leaving them there); id. at 21 (reporting that homeless in Santa Monica were ticketed while
standing on sidewalks).
153. Church v. Huntsville, 1993 WL 646401 at *2.
154. CHICAGO, ILL., CITY CODE § 8-4010(f) (1958).
155. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-17 (2) (1990). A California statute defining "disorderly conduct"
to include "accost[ing] ... for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms" was held unconstitutional by
a federal district court. Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also Heathcott v.
Las Vegas Metro. Police Officers, CV-S-93-045-LDG (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 1994) (holding law prohibiting
loitering with intent to beg unconstitutional).
156. Raleigh, N.C., Ordinance No. 1994-447 (July 19, 1994) (pertaining to solicitation of persons
in motor vehicles).
157. Enforcement, however, may be limited to begging; this may be the result of explicit city
direction. For example, in a brochure describing its ordinance prohibiting solicitation, Santa Cruz
includes a parenthetical notation "panhandling" after the title "solicitation." SANTA CRUZ, CAL., POLICE
DEPARTMENT, CITY PUBLC PROPERTY ORDINANCES (n.d.). Such unequal enforcement, however, may
raise concerns under the Equal Protection Clause. See Patton v. Baltimore, No. S-93-2389, slip op. at
50 (D. Md. 1994).
158. This is because of the likely unconstitutionality of broad bans. See infra Section rIr.C; see also
CITY OF TUCSON, ARiz., MAYOR AND COUNCIL MEMORANDUM (n.d.) (stating this explicitly). Narrow
laws may have constitutional defects as well, see Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), aft'd, 64 U.S.L.W. 2598 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996) (rejecting facial challenge to
ordinance).
159. E.g., RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 99 (describing New York City Transit
Authority laws prohibiting begging on subways).
160. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3306 (Supp. 1994).
161. Alexandria, Va., Ordinance 3716 (Apr. 16, 1994), adding tit. 13 § 13-1-41.
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public telephone or bench.1 2 Prohibitions on begging during certain times as
well as in certain places include an Akron ordinance that prohibits all
panhandling on public streets, sidewalks and other public property "after sunset
or before sunrise.""
Increasingly, cities are enacting prohibitions on "aggressive panhandling,"
generally defined to include behavior that affects the person being solicited in
a particular manner.16 For example, a San Francisco law prohibits "closely
follow[ing]" another and repeating a request after the person being solicited has
"expressly or impliedly made it known" that he or she does not want to
give.165 An Atlanta ordinance prohibits "approaching or speaking to someone
in such a manner as would cause a reasonable person to fear imminent bodily
harm or the commission of a criminal act upon his/her person,"166 and
"continuing to request, beg or solicit alms in close proximity to the [person]
... after the person ... has made a negative response, blocking the passage
of the [person], or otherwise engaging in conduct which could reasonably be
construed as intended to compel or force a person to accede to demands." 167
3. Indirect Restrictions
In addition to direct restrictions on homeless people, many cities restrict
individuals or groups attempting to aid them. One major example is the so-
called Not-In-My-Back-Yard ("NIMBY") phenomenon, which prevents
programs serving homeless people from locating in certain-or in some cases
any-neighborhoods. 6 Typically, this involves the use of zoning or building
162. Santa Cruz Ordinance No. 94-13, SANTA CRUZ, CAL. CITY CODE § 5.43 (1994); see also
Santa Monica, Cal., Ordinance No. 1773 (Oct. 25, 1994) (abusive begging includes coming closer than
three feet).
163. Akron, Ohio Ordinance 536-1994 (1994), amending AKRON CITY CODE Title 13 § 135; see
also Santa Cruz, Cal., Ordinance 94-10 (Mar. 8, 1994).
164. District of Columbia, Panhandling Control Congressional Recess Emergency Act of 1993, 10
D.C. Reg. 98 § 3 (a)(Aug. 4, 1993) adding D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3306.
165. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance Prohibiting Harassing or Handling Solicitation (1992),
amending SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. CITY CODE Part I, ch. 8, § 120-1 (1992) (prohibiting "harass[ing] or
hound[ing] another person for the purpose of inducing that person to give money or other thing of
value").
166. Atlanta, Ga., An Ordinance to Amend Part 17 of the Code of the Ordinances of the City of
Atlanta, amending Part 17 (July 17, 1991).
167. Id.; see also Beverly Hills, Cal., Ordinance 93-0-2165 (Mar. 23, 1993), adding ch. 6, tit. 5;
Panhandling Control Congressional Recess Emergency Act of 1993, 10 D.C. Reg. 98; Sacramento,
Cal., An Ordinance Adding Chapter 10.00 to Title 10 of the Sacramento City Code (Nov. 3, 1993);
Westminster, Cal., Ordinance 2226 (July 12, 1993); Raleigh, N.C. Ordinance 1994-495, adding § 12-
1026(d) (1994). Some cities have attempted to regulate begging by requiring beggars to obtain licenses
or prohibiting "knowingly mak[ing] false or misleading representation in the course of soliciting," such
as claiming a non-existent need and falsely claiming one is homeless. Akron, Ohio, Ordinance 536-
1994, amending AKRON, OH. CITY CODE Title 13, ch. 135 (1994).
168. See generally No ROOM FOR THE INN, supra note 12 (describing local opposition to housing
and social service facilities for homeless in 36 cities). See also NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra
note 9, at i; RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 17-18.
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codes to prevent programs from obtaining needed permits or variances. 169
Such exclusionary efforts may be mounted by private individuals, neighborhood
or business groups, as well as by cities themselves; however, they rely on local
laws and administrative or court processes. 7°
Cities may pass zoning laws specifically to restrict services and programs
for homeless people from certain parts of the city.' They may also enforce
such laws selectively, as when shelters or other such programs are targeted for
enforcement of code provisions that are generally not otherwise enforced.17
There may be more subtle barriers as well: zoning provisions that require
variances for such programs-and which may be routinely granted for other
purposes-create an opportunity for opposition that may allow even a small
number of persons to stop a program.
In addition to zoning, cities impose other indirect restrictions. For
example, the New York City Transit Authority mounted a public relations
campaign to deter subway riders from giving money to beggars. 73 San
Francisco enforced laws against individuals distributing free food to hungry
people in a public park. 74 Some deter business establishments from serving
homeless clients. 75 Restrictions on services may accompany direct restric-
tions on homeless people: A city may restrict services as part of an effort to
keep homeless people out of the city or an area of it.
76
B. Purposes of Criminalization
Some cities state expressly that their intention is to drive their homeless
residents out of the city. Examples include policies or plans to "force"
homeless people out of town; to make clear that they are "no longer welcome
169. See generally NO ROOM FOR THE INN, supra note 12. See also No HOMELESS PEOPLE
ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 5; RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 17.
170. See generally No ROOM FOR THE INN, supra note 12; see also No HOMELESS PEOPLE
ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 5; RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 17.
171. For example, Dallas zoning codes were revised in 1991 to prohibit construction of new
shelters in central business district. RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 17, 77 (citations
omitted).
172. See Church v. City of Huntsvile, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401, at *2 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 23, 1993), preliminary injunction vacated, 30 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1994) (declaring that city
"uses its inspection department and zoning laws in an uneven manner to discourage the establishment
and continued operation of homeless shelters in residential areas of the city").
173. RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 99-100 (citations omitted).
174. No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 32-33.
175. In Atlanta the City Council adopted an ordinance to require operators of motels, hotels and
SROs to monitor and supervise their guests, and to require that clients provide a permanent address as
a condition of registering. Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance to Amend Article F of Chapter 6 of Part 14 (1991).
176. E.g., Church, 1993 WL 646401; Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla.
1992). Conversely, a city may provide services at the same time that it restricts homeless peoples' public
activities. E.g., Santa Monica, Cal., Ordinance 1742 (May 10, 1994) (emergency ordinance waiving
variety of requirements for construction of a new emergency shelter); see also NO HOMELESS PEOPLE
ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 17-18.
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in the City;" 1 to make the city "inhospitable to homeless people;"178 and
"to show these folks where the city limits are."179 In other cases, the stated
purpose is to remove homeless people from particular places, such as parks,
streets or downtown areas.180 In some cases, an express purpose of prohibi-
tions on begging and public place restrictions is to order people to move along,
rather than to arrest them, 8' and city laws may be used to move people away
from specific areas such as ATMs. 11 Some target the "visible" homeless
with the goal of making them "invisible. " 1
Cities cite a variety of reasons for these policies; often, several are cited
together. Some cities associate homeless people with crime"M or equate them
with "criminal elements; 1a others associate activities such as begging with
crime." Others express concern about public health and sanitation problems
associated with people living in public; 8 or about the health and safety of
177. Tobe v. Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 387 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Allen E. Doby,
Executive Director of the Recreation Services Agency, Vagrants (Municipal Memorandum dated June
16, 1988)).
178. Brief for the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, et al. as Amicus Curiae at 3,
Joyce v. City of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-16940) (citation omitted).
179. Church, 1993 WL 646401, at *2.
180. For example, a police memorandum states these goals and strategies: "keep the homeless
moving in order to 'sanitize'" city parks and streets; remove 'undesirables' from parks and discourage
their return; and "eliminate" the homeless or "move them out" of certain areas. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp.
at 1567 (citing internal police memoranda, Plaintiff's Exhibits 2A-7C, 2B, 7C). A city official's
memorandum notes that the city does not want "unsightly homeless people in the downtown
development area." Id. at 1568. Referring to people standing in a food line, a police memorandum
describes a plan "to arrest and/or force the extraction of the undesirables from the area." Id. at 1567
(quoting patrol supervisor memorandum, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3L).
181. See, e.g., RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 118 (quoting chief sponsor of
Washington, D.C., panhandling law, CouncilmemberJim Nathanson: "The purpose of the law is to give
the police the authority to tell the panhandlers to move on... [Tihe fine or jail is a threat the police
can use.") (citation omitted).
182. See, e.g., No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 33-34 (citing laws in City of
San Francisco).
183. Another police memorandum specifically notes the targeting of the "visible homeless,"
progress in "see[ing] a decrease in the number," and that "the homeless remain almost invisible" as a
result of this effort. Brief for Appellant at 8, & 8 n.5, Joyce v. City of San Francisco, No. 95-16940
(9th Cir., filed Jan. 16, 1996) (citations omitted).
184. See NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at22 (discussing response to complaints
by businesses in Huntington Beach, California).
185. Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 940871 (Feb. 23, 1994). Letter from Dallas, Tex. City Councilman
Glenn Box to Constituent (Mar. 3, 1994) ("Not only have individuals been aggressively panhandled,
but individuals and businesses in the area have been victims of robberies, burglaries, rapes, and
shootings, all of which can be directly attributed to [the homeless] residing under the bridges.").
186. E.g., Committee on the Judiciary, Council of the District of Columbia, Panhandling Control
Act of 1993, at 2-3 (May 12, 1993) (associating begging from motorists with caijacking, and stating
many panhandlers are not homeless but rather are "confidence operators who prey on the elderly and
tourists who are uncertain about the genuine needs of the panhandler"). This illustrates the tendency of
some legislatures to blame the homeless for any crimes. RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9,
at 107-08.
187. See, e.g., Brief for the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, et al. as Amicus
Curiae at 8, Joyce v. City of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-16940) (quoting police
memorandum describing policy of "zero tolerance" towards "filth, flea infested, desease [sic] ridden
people"); see also Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 445 (W.D. Wash. 1994), preliminary
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homeless people living on the streets."'8 Cities also frequently cite concerns
that the presence of homeless people or beggars adversely affects businesses or
tourism. 18 9 Another type of purpose is "preserving the appearance" of public
areas and facilities."ro Some cities simply express concern about "homeless
people wandering around."191
Some cities combine actions aimed at removing homeless people with
actions aimed at aiding them. For instance, some city councils have adopted
policies to "remove" homeless people while also providing some aid;
Some cities refer homeless people to shelters and other services while also
removing them from downtown or other areas."rc In support of such efforts,
cities cite concerns that by not taking action they are "enabling self-destructive
behavior, " 194 the need to "obtain order and accountability on the part of the
homeless who people the streets,"" 9 and an intent to "redirect" homeless
people to shelters or services. 96
Increasingly, cities appear to be citing purposes that do not specifically
mention homeless people or express a goal to remove them. This is particularly
the case in official legislative statements of intent, and possibly in public
statements by city officials. In some cases, this is likely to reflect concern
injunction vacated, 64 U.S.L.W. 2598 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996) (stating purpose of challenged law to
be "to facilitate the safe and efficient movement of pedestrians and goods.., to eliminate public safety
hazard[s], and to protect the economic health and productivity of commercial areas").
188. No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 22 (reporting that business owners in
Huntington Beach, California were concerned about health and safety of homeless in encampments).
189. See, e.g., Memorandum from Michael F. Brown, City Manager, Tucson, Arizona, to Mayor
and City Council of Tucson, Arizona (n.d.) (on file with author) (discussing proposed panhandling
ordinance based in part on concern by business association about business disruption) [hereinafter Brown
Memorandum]; see also No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 102 (discussing the anti-
panhandling ordinance for Nashville, Tennessee that was proposed by business association but
subsequently withdrawn).
190. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 395 (Cal. App. 1994), superseded, 272 P.2d
559 (Cal. 1994), judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
191. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
192. Following media attention as well as pressure from advocates and homeless people, the Dallas
City Council passed a resolution that simultaneously outlined past measures taken with regard to a
homeless center and ordered that homeless people be removed from public places. See Jacobson, supra
note 98. In some cases the reverse happens and existing aid is eliminated or capped. E.g., Santa
Monica, Cal. Ordinance 1773 (Oct. 25, 1994), amending SANTA MONICA, CAL. CITY CODE § 5.08.370
(1995) (applying restaurant standards to those who distribute to homeless). See also Brief for Appellant
at 6, Joyce v. City of San Francisco, No. 95-16940 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that in 1992, San Francisco
closed half of its shelter rooms).
193. E.g., Brief for Defendant at 15, Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (stating that outreach team consists of two social workers, mental health worker, and police
officer).
194. Brief for the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, et al. as Arnici Curiae at 7,
Joyce v. City of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-16940) (citing city declarations regarding
homeless people).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Dallas, Tex., Resolution for Construction of a Homeless Assistance Center (Feb.
23, 1994).
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about possible litigation, which many cities are aware of and concerned
about." z Noting the absence of "smoking-gun memos, minutes of the city
council, or statements by public officials," one court wrote that after years of
litigation, the city learned this lesson: "Do not document an intention to
displace the homeless."
9 8
Overall, cities cite a variety of reasons for their actions."9 Nonetheless,
removal of homeless people from cities or city areas, in general or for
particular occasions, is usually a common underlying goal of criminalizing
measures. Alternatively stated, the goal may be to prevent people from
engaging in certain kinds of activities in all or some public places: for
example, sleeping, begging, urinating, sitting. However, homeless people are
those who regularly, and necessarily, engage in such activities in public; so
long as this is the case, the two formulations are essentially the same.
C. Effects of Criminalization
Cities instituting criminalizing measures typically do not offer assis-
tance-emergency or long-term-in any way sufficient to allow their homeless
residents to move off the streets or out of the shelters. None of the cities
included in the 1994 survey had sufficient shelter spaces for their homeless
populations. Nor did any have sufficient affordable housing, employment, or
income assistance."O Cities that enforce prohibitions on sleeping in public
may penalize homeless people who have no alternative place to sleep. Cities
that enforce anti-begging laws may be penalizing people who may have no
alternative sources for survival. In these circumstances, the effect is that
homeless people must either violate the law or leave the covered area.
In practice, cities generally use different types of ordinances and enforce-
ment policies in combination."' This increases the overall impact, particular-
ly where restrictions on services are combined with restrictions on homeless
people. For example, in Huntsville, Alabama, private shelters attempting to
serve homeless people "swept" from downtown streets were closed by city
197. See, e.g., Brown Memorandum, supra note 189.
198. Tobe v. Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 342 n.4 (1994), superseded, 272 P.2d 559 (Cal.
1994), judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
199. For example, in Dallas the City Council adopted a resolution to begin enforcing its prohibition
on public sleeping while at the same time noting it would provide additional shelter "in the near future."
The Director of the city's Department of Health and Human Services noted that some homeless people
could not afford the fees charged by shelters, some could not meet the eligibility criteria, and some did
not "like the rules." Nonetheless, she concluded that the city had "adequate services... [but you can't
force [homeless people] to do what they don't want to do." Jacobson, supra note 98, at 30A.
200. The 1994 study did not include this information, but the 1993 study found that none of the
cities for which data was available had anywhere near sufficient mental health services. See RIGHT TO
REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at Table II (Supp.).
201. See, e.g., Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Roulette v.
Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994), af'd, 64 U.S.L.W. 2598 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996)
(rejecting facial challenge); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
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officials applying building and zoning codes in a selective manner.? The
effect of such a combination-which both prohibits public sleeping and the
operation of shelters in a given area-may be an absolute, and lasting,
prohibition on homeless persons' presence in that area.'1
The increased prevalence of restrictions on both homeless people and
service providers across the country magnifies their impact, potentially creating
a domino effect. A given community's efforts to force its homeless residents
out, if successful, will drive them into neighboring communities; these
communities may then in turn pursue similar efforts.' Over the longer run,
if the current trend continues, the effect will be one of pervasive banishment:
homeless Americans may literally be left with nowhere to go.'
III. COURT RULINGS: DIVERGENT RESULTS AND ANALYSES
As local government actions directed against homeless people have
increased, so too have legal challenges to them. Homeless people, service
providers, and advocacy groups have raised a variety of legal arguments,
including claims based on the United States Constitution, in challenges to city
laws and practices.2 'e To date, the resulting court rulings have been mixed,
and in some cases conflicting.' Important recent rulings have overturned
ordinances and policies directed against homeless people in some cities,ea
202. Church v. City of Huntsville, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401, at *2 (N.D. Ala.
1993), preliminary injunction vacated, 30 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1994).
203. Some challenges to restrictions on service providers have relied on the Fair Housing Act. See,
e.g., Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell, Idaho, No. 94-0169-S-CMB (D. Idaho Dec. 28, 1994).
These challenges, while significant and relevant, will not be discussed here.
204. In a striking example of this effect, seven neighboring Southern California municipalities
adopted anti-sleeping ordinances within 18 months of each other. See RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE,
supra note 9, at ii (citing Shelter Partnership, HOMELESS REPORTER, Apr. 1993, at 1,9).
205. Some commentators have recently proposed or imagined the extermination of homeless people.
See Bob Erlenbusch, Radio Station KM: The Killing Frequency of Intolerance, HOSPITALrrY: OPEN
DOOR COMMUNITY NEWSLETTER, May 1995, at 5 (discussing radio disk jockey's advocacy of killing
homeless people with ovens); Essays Anger Mensa Members, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1995, at AS
(reporting controversy after Mensa newsletter published articles advocating killing homeless, retarded,
and elderly); Nora Zamichow, L.A. Mensa Chapter Told to Fire Newsletter Editor, L.A. TIMES (Wash.
ed.), Jan. 13, 1995, at B I (recounting firing of newsletter editor); See also Homeless People Make Great
Pets!, WASH. CITY PAPER, July 29, 1994 (cartoon "advertising" Poorina Homeless Chow).
206. E.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (1994), superseded, 272 P.2d 559
(Cal. 1994), judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995). In some cases, challenges are made in both
contexts. Id.
207. E.g., Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Loper v. New York City
Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d
Cir. 1990); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Joyce v. City of San
Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
208. E.g., Church v. City of Huntsville, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 23, 1993), preliminary injunction vacated, 30 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1994); Joyce v. City of San
Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. 1551; State of Nevada v.
Father Richard, 836 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1992).
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limited some,2°9 and upheld others.210
This Part reviews these rulings and their divergent results and analyses. In
the area of begging, it identifies points of consensus as well as dispute, and
argues that begging is fully protected expression. In the area of public place
restrictions, it identifies differing conceptual assumptions, and argues for an
approach that supports one view while also addressing the concerns of the
other. The Part ends by summarizing and drawing some conclusions.
A. Begging
Challenges to restrictions on begging focus primarily on First Amendment
protections of freedom of expression. Some courts have also considered
whether restrictions on begging differ from restrictions on other forms of
solicitation, raising concerns under the Equal Protection Clause.
211
1. The First Amendment
Courts have disagreed on the threshold question whether begging is
protected expression under the First Amendment. Some courts have held that
begging is fully protected expression. Applying traditional analysis, they have
struck down broad restrictions on begging in public forums, while permit-
ting narrowly drawn "time, place and manner" restrictions. In contrast,
other courts have held that begging is actually conduct rather than expression,
and thus not protected under the First Amendment; in some cases they have
also noted that even if begging were protected, prohibitions on conduct
associated with it would not be.214 Such courts have upheld restrictions on
209. E.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aft'd, 64 U.S.L.W.
2598 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996) (rejecting facial challenge).
210. E.g., Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843; Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 386; Roulette, 850 F. Supp. 1442.
211. E.g., Blair, 775 F. Supp. 1315.
212. E.g., Blair, 775 F. Supp. 1315; Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1993). Under traditional analysis, expression in a "public forum" is accorded the highest degree of
protection. Content-based restrictions on expression in such a forum must be necessary to serve a
"compelling" state interest and must be "narrowly drawn" to achieve that end; content-neutral regulation
of the "time, place or manner" of expression is permitted so long as it is narrowly drawn and leaves
open ample alternative channels of communication. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983); Loper, 999 F.2d at 703. Public forums include government property "traditionally"
available for public expression, such as streets and parks, which are "quintessential" public forums.
Loper, 999 F.2d at 703 (citing Peny, 460 U.S. at 45).
213. E.g., Loper, 999 F.2d at 703.
214. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1993); Seattle v.
Webster, 115 Wash. 2d 635 (1990). A regulation of conduct that is "directed at the communicative
nature of the conduct" must be evaluated as a restriction on speech and justified by the "substantial
showing of need that the First Amendment requires." Young, 903 F.2d at 157, quoting Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (citation omitted). But a regulation of conduct will be upheld if the
limitation on expression is "incidental," and the regulation protects a "sufficiently important government
interest" that is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." (quoting United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
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begging, or what they have construed as conduct associated with it.215
Charitable solicitation is expression protected by the First Amendment. In
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,2 6 the Supreme
Court noted that "[s]olicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative
and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on ... social issues." 217 The Court held that "charitable
appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech
interests."2' The ordinance struck down by the Court prohibited solicitation
by charities that did not use at least seventy-five percent of their revenue for
219charitable purposes.
In Young v. New York City Transit Authority, the Second Circuit held that
begging is not protected solicitation.' The court reasoned that "[c]ommon
sense tells us that begging is much more 'conduct' than it is 'speech.'"'"
Applying the Supreme Court's test for determining whether conduct is
expressive and thus protected, the court concluded that begging is not
"inseparably intertwined with a 'particularized message,'" and that beggars are
rather simply trying "to collect money."' The court drew a distinction
between begging by individuals and solicitation by organized charities: "While
organized charities serve community interests by enhancing communication and
disseminating ideas, the conduct of begging and panhandling in the subway
amounts to nothing less than a menace to the common good."'
In contrast, three years later, in Loper v. New York City Police Dep't,2
a different panel of the Second Circuit invalidated a New York state statute
prohibiting loitering with intent to beg on city streets. The court saw no
significant distinction for First Amendment purposes between organized
215. Young, 903 F.2d at 153-54.
216. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
217. Id. at 632.
218. Id.
219. The Court noted that the ordinance was not narrowly drawn to serve its interest in "protecting
the public from fraud, crime, and undue annoyance." Id. at 636.
220. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
221. Id. at 153.
222. Id. at 153-54 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). Furthermore, the
court suggested that any expressive element might be erased by the "special circumstances" of the
subway, where it is the conduct, "totally independent of any particularized message, that passengers
experience as threatening, harassing and intimidating." Young, 903 F.2d at 154. But the court also noted
that its holding "does not ultimately rest on an ontological distinction between speech and conduct,"
presumably because it went on to apply first amendment analysis and uphold the regulation under it. Id.
223. Young, 903 F.2d at 156. In Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991), the court
expressly rejected the Young court's reasoning, and noted that it found this statement "disturbing." Id.
at 1323 n.9.
224. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Blair, 775 F.
Supp. 1315; Heathcott v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Officers, CV-S-93-045-LDG (D. Nev. Mar. 3,
1994); Patton v. City of Baltimore, Civ. No. S-93-2389 (D.Md. Aug. 19, 1994); Roulette v. City of
Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (1994), aff'd, 64 U.S.L.W. 2598 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996) (rejecting facial
challenge).
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charities, which communicate the needs of others, and beggars, who communi-
cate their own needs. 225 Further, the court concluded that begging usually
involves some communication of a "social or political message."' The court
noted that begging is often accompanied by speech indicating the need for
food, shelter, transportation or medical care; moreover, even in the absence of
particularized speech, the presence of an "unkempt and disheveled person"
holding out a hand or cup conveys a "message of need for support and
assistance."'2
The Loper court's conclusion that begging is protected expression is clearly
correct.' Begging generally is defined by speech: a request for money or
other aid.229 Even where a beggar is silent, there is some other clear form of
communication, such as a sign, donation cup or outstretched hand; indeed, with
the exception of such actions, there is no conduct which is characteristic of
begging.? 0 Moreover, a constitutional distinction between solicitation by
"organized charities" and needy individuals is contrary to Supreme Court
rulings that professional fundraisers-who solicit solely for payment-are fully
protected by the First Amendment." Finally, while the recitation of poetry
cited by the Young court as a clear example of protected expression may
express a range of human needs, °2 so too does a beggar's request for spare
change; the sole difference is one of format and-perhaps-eloquence and
immediacy. This should not be the basis for a constitutional distinction.
225. Rather, the court concluded, "[b]oth solicit the charity of others." Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
Similarly, a federal district court struck down a Nevada statute prohibiting loitering with intent to beg.
Heathcott, CV-S-93-045-LDG. Another federal district court struck down a California statute prohibiting
.accost[ing] other persons in any public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose of
begging or soliciting alms" as violative of the First Amendment. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324-25. The
court held the statute was content-specific, applied to public forums, and was not narrowly-tailored to
meet a compelling state interest. Id.
226. Loper, 999 F.2d at 704. The holdings of the cases are distinguishable: Young involved a
restriction limited to subways, while Loper involved a city-wide ban. Still, the different analyses of the
two courts may imply different conclusions even allowing for these differences.
227. Id. at 704.
228. See, e.g., Patton, Civ. No. S-93-2389; Roulette, 850 F. Supp. 1442; Blair, 775 F. Supp.
1315.
229. The question whether begging communicates any particularized "social or political" message
is inapposite, since that is an inquiry applicable to expressive conduct, not to speech. See Young v. New
York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
230. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Helen Hershkoff & Adam Cohen, Begging to
Differ, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 904-10 (1991).
231. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32 (1980).
In Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), which applied First
Amendment protection to a professional fund raiser, the Supreme Court directly addressed this point.
Id. at 801. See also Blair, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1316-17. Precisely because of their destitution, homeless
and extremely poor people often are not able to organize themselves into groups; denying protection to
them would threaten the further disappearance of their voices. See id.; see also THERESA FUNICELLO,
TYRANNY OF KINDNEsS (1993) (arguing that organizations that purport to speak on behalf of the poor
may not always do so; their nature and structure may conflict with interests or desires of poor
themselves).
232. Young, 903 F.2d at 154 (recitation of Donne or Keats clearly protected).
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Given a conclusion that begging is fully protected expression, the level of
judicial review depends on the characterization of the restriction.133 In Loper,
because the prohibition as challenged 4 applied to the public streets and
parks of the city, the court applied public forum analysis, and held that the
statute did not meet its stringent criteria.2 5 First, because it prohibited speech
relating to begging, but not other forms of solicitation, it was not "content
neutral. " 1 6 Second, even if the state's interest in preventing fraud, intimida-
tion, coercion, and harassment was "compelling," the total ban imposed by the
statute was not narrowly tailored to serve it.7 The court observed that
"there are a number of statutes that address this sort of conduct directly."
Moreover, the statute could not be considered to serve even an "important"
government interest, because the state permitted street solicitations by persons
representing organized charities.
Narrowly tailored restrictions on begging in a public forum also raise First
Amendment concerns. Restrictions that apply to begging-and not to speech
generally-are not content-neutral, since their applicability depends on what is
being communicated."38 In a nonpublic forum, a less stringent standard
applies. Restrictions must be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 9 But most
restrictions on begging are aimed at public areas, and thus are subject to public
forum analysis.'
233. In Young, assuming arguendo that begging was conduct that possessed some communicative
qualities, Young, 903 F.2d at 157, the court considered the regulation not to be "directed at speech
itself" but rather "incidental" to it, and applied a relatively lenient standard of review. Id. (quoting
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989), United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)
(regulation of conduct with "incidental" limitation on expression will be upheld if it protects a
"sufficiently important government interest"). The court held that the regulation furthered an
government important interest in promoting safety in the subways, that it was not based on any objection
to any idea or message conveyed by begging, and that it left open alternative channels of communica-
tion. Young, 903 F.2d at 157-61. The court also applied public forum analysis, although it said it was
not necessary to its holding, and upheld the regulation.
234. The state statute was challenged as enforced in those places. Loper v. New York City Police
Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1993).
235. Expression in a "public forum" is accorded the highest degree of protection. Content-based
restrictions on expression in such a forum must be necessary to serve a "compelling" state interest and
must be "narrowly drawn" to achieve that end; content-neutral regulation of the "time, place, or
manner" of expression is permitted so long as it is narrowly drawn and leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication. Government property "traditionally" available for public expression, such
as streets and parks, is a "quintessential" public forum. Loper, 999 F.2d at 703 (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
236. Loper, 999 F.2d at 705.
237. Applying the more lenient O'Brien standard, see supra note 233, the court also held that the
total prohibition could not be considered "incidental" because it served to "silence both speech and
expressive conduct on the basis of the message." Loper, 999 F.2d at 705.
238. See Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991). But see Patton v. City of
Baltimore, Civ. No. S-93-2389 (D.Md. Aug. 19, 1994) (distinguishing between aggressive solicitation
and other aggressive speech would be permissible under equal protection clause).
239. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (invalidating
ban on leafletting in airport).
240. See supra Subsection ll.A.2.
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2. The Equal Protection Clause
Laws restricting begging may also implicate the Equal Protection Clause.
Prohibitions on panhandling, but not other forms of solicitation, have been held
to be content-specific, implicating the First Amendment. Free speech is, of
course, a "fundamental right" in equal protection analysis. 2" Accordingly,
unless this differential treatment is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest, it violates the Equal Protection Clause.'4
In Blair v. Shanahan, a federal district court held that a statute prohibiting
"accost[ing] . . . for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms" violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it was content-based. 3 The court held that
the law treated differently those who approached others to solicit alms and
those who approached others to communicate about anything else. Further,
while the city may have a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting
residents from intimidation, the court held that the law swept too broadly.
"Solicitations for alms are not generally and frequently enough proxies for
intimidating or coercive threats to justify this statute."I"
Discriminatory enforcement of anti-panhandling laws may also violate the
Equal Protection Clause. In Patton v. Baltimore City, the court held that
plaintiffs' allegations that the city had a practice of directing homeless people,
but not other people, to move along, and directing panhandlers, but not other
solicitors, to stop soliciting, stated a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause.24 Further, because plaintiffs had shown that this alleged practice
interfered with their fundamental rights "to move about" and to freedom of
expression, such discrimination would have to be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest, under the strict scrutiny standard.'
3. Aggressive Panhandling
Aggressive panhandling ordinances, on the increase in cities across the
country, restrict "aggressive" begging, which is typically defined to include at
least some conduct.247 In addition, they typically include limited restrictions,
241. E.g., Patton v. City of Baltimore, Civ. No. S-93-2389 (D.Md. Aug. 19, 1994).
242. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,461-62 (1972); Patton, Civ. No. S-93-2389, slip op. at 61;
Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324.
243. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1325, citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 460.
244. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1325-26.
245. Patton, Civ. No. S-93-2389, slip op. at 49, 50.
246. Id. at 50; see also infra Subsection I.B.2.c. Following this ruling, the Baltimore City Council
amended the ordinance to prohibit all aggressive solicitation, presumably addressing the court's concern.
Indeed, the court had specifically suggested this remedy. Patton, Civ. No. S-93-2389, slip op. at 50.
247. E.g., Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 113697, amending SEATrLE, WASH. CITYCODE §§ 12A.12.-
010-12A.12.01S (1987); Panhandling Control Congressional Recess Emergency Act of 1993, 10 D.C.
Reg. 98 § 2; Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance to Amend ATLANTA, GA. CODE OF ORDINANcES § 17-3006
(1991).
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such as prohibitions on begging within ten feet of an automated teller
machine.248 Generally, they are an effort to respond to the recent case law by
more narrowly crafting restrictions on begging so as to avoid the First Amend-
ment's constraints on laws restricting begging.249 But aggressive panhandling
laws may also raise First Amendment, as well as Equal Protection Clause,
concerns.
In Roulette v. Seattle, a federal district court upheld that city's aggressive
panhandling law only after limiting it to cover only threats. The ordinance
prohibited "beg[ging] with the intent to intimidate another person into giving
money or goods";" ° the city argued in its briefs that "intimidate" should be
construed narrowly by the court to mean conduct which "threatens" the person
solicited.25' Adopting this limiting construction, the court held that "threats
to cause bodily injury or physical damage to the property of another.., are not
protected speech." 2 However, the court struck down a portion of the
ordinance, which included persisting in begging after the person solicited had
given a negative response as an example of evidence to intimidate, as vague
and overbroad. 3
The court in Patton 4 considered the constitutionality of the city's
"Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance. ' ,255 The court concluded that the statute
was content-specific because it penalized only aggressive panhandling and not
other forms of aggressive solicitation.5 6 The court held that while the city
had a compelling interest in protecting persons from intimidation, it had made
no showing that panhandling is inherently more intimidating than any other type
of solicitation for money. Thus, the distinction did not serve, and was not
248. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3306 (Supp. 1994).
249. E.g., Brown Memorandum, supra note 189; Panhandling Control Congressional Recess
Emergency Act of 1993, 10 D.C. Reg. 98 § 3(c).
250. The court defined "intimidate" as a "conduct which would make a reasonable person fearful
or feel compelled," and assumed (and the city did not dispute) that "peaceful" begging is entitled to
"some First Amendment protection." Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 (W.D. Wash.
1994), aff'd, 64 U.S.L.W. 2598 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996) (rejecting facial challenge).
251. Id. at 1453.
252. Id. at 1453 (citing State v. Brown, 748 P.2d 276 (1988)).
253. The court stated that some of the circumstances describe speech which is "clearly protected,"
and that others lacked specificity. Id. at 1454.
254. Patton v. City of Baltimore, Civ. No. S-93-2389 (D.Md. Aug. 19, 1994).
255. The ordinance prohibited aggressive panhandling, defined as panhandling combined with one
or more of six types of conduct, as well as panhandling, aggressive or passive, at "inherently
intimidating" locations (within 10 feet of any automatic teller machine; in any public transportation
vehicle, stop or station; on private or residential property if the owner, tenant or occupant has asked the
person not to panhandle or has posted a sign; from occupants of motor vehicles that are in traffic on
public streets; and from occupants of motor vehicles on streets in exchange for reserving or finding a
parking space). Patton, Civ. No. S-93-2389, slip op. at 6-7.
256. Id. at 56-59. The court also held that panhandling is a form of charitable solicitation protected
by the first amendment and that the distinction between soliciting funds for a charities and for oneself
is "not a distinction of constitutional dimension." Id. at 55-56 (citing Loper v. New York City Police
Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993); and Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (N.D. Cal.
1991)).
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"finely tailored" to serve, the city's interest. The court held that the distinction
could not be justified under the Equal Protection Clause.3
Aggressive panhandling laws, narrowly crafted, penalize acts that are likely
already prohibited. However, they have the effect, and perhaps the purpose,
of singling out particular types of persons-beggars. In fact, they are often
passed as a part of a larger set of laws aimed at homeless people."8 At a
minimum, this may increase the possibility of selective enforcement in actually
carrying out the law: such laws may send a message to police, as well as to the
public, that begging, and beggars, pose a special threat."s9 In addition, it may
be reason for a court to question the validity-or importance-of any
government interest offered in support of the law.' As the Second Circuit
observed in Loper:
It is ludicrous, of course, to say that a statute that prohibits loitering for the purpose
of begging provides the only authority that is available to prevent and punish all
socially undesirable conduct incident to begging... . There are, in fact, a number
of. . . statutes that proscribe conduct of the type that may accompany individual
solicitations for money."
Anti-panhandling laws that are narrow enough so as to prohibit only
conduct and not expression, and so pass muster under the First Amendment,
will almost certainly be redundant. Alternatively, if they are broad enough to
pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause, they will not be targeted
enough to achieve their apparent goal: to prevent the poor-but not other solici-
tors-from begging in public places.
257. Id. at 66. The Patton court limited this ruling to solicitation, stating that discriminating
between aggressive solicitation generally and other aggressive speech would be permissible. "Aggressive
begging and aggressive direction seeking are simply worlds apart." Id. at 69. Other courts have not
made such a distinction, however, ruling instead that differential treatment of potentially intimidating
solicitation as against other forms of speech violates the equal protection clause. Blair, 775 F. Supp.
at 1325-26.
258. See Berkeley Community Health Project v. City of Berkeley, No. C. 95-0665-CW (N.D. Cal.
May 5, 1995), slip op. at24 (discussing linkage of sitting and panhandling ordinance cited as supporting
court's conclusion that sitting ordinance was aimed at panhandlers).
259. Such messages may also signal that aggression or violence against homeless people is
acceptable. In fact, violent actions against homeless people appear to have increased over the past few
years. See HoMBS, supra note 73.
260. Aggressive panhandling laws appear to be enforced loosely, at least in part because very few
beggars engage in the proscribed behavior. For example, in San Francisco, a police "sting" operation
targeted at "aggressive panhandlers" expended 450 hours of police time and $11,000 but resulted in only
15 arrests and no convictions. RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 41. The police sergeant
in charge of the operation stated that "the overwhelming number of panhandlers... ask for money,
then when refused say, 'thank you, have a nice day,' or 'God bless you.'" Id. at 41-42, and internal
police memoranda cited therein.
261. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1993).
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B. Public Place Restrictions
Public place restrictions have been challenged as facially unconstitutional;
more recently, they have also been challenged as applied to homeless people.
This section briefly reviews the earlier facial challenges. It then focuses on the
as applied challenges, discussing in some detail three important recent cases.
It then reviews the relevant constitutional principles and Supreme Court
precedent and discusses their application to public place restrictions on
homeless persons.
1. Facial Challenges
A group of decisions beginning in the 1970s considered facial challenges
to laws prohibiting sleeping, camping, lying, or sitting in public places;'s of
these, several concerned challenges to laws specifically prohibiting sleeping or
"lodging" in motor vehicles.'s3 These facial challenges were based primarily
on constitutional overbreadth or vagueness grounds; a few also included equal
protection or right to travel claims.' While such challenges were upheld in
some cases,2as they were often rejected.'
For example, in Whiting v. Town of Vesterly, the plaintiffs were travelers
who had spent the night in their car after being unable to find other accommo-
dation and were arrested under a town ordinance prohibiting sleeping out of
doors. 267 In response to their constitutional challenge to the ordinance, the
court held that the law was neither overbroad nor vague.2 The court
262. E.g., Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1991); Seeley v. State of Arizona,
655 P.2d 803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (ordinance prohibiting lying, sitting and sleeping); People v.
Davenport, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986)
(ordinance prohibiting sleeping in public); Parr v. Municipal Court, 479 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1971)
(ordinance prohibiting sitting and lying in public); State v. Penley, 276 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973) (ordinance prohibiting sleeping in public); City of Portland v. Johnson, 651 P.2d 1384 (Or. Ct.
App. 1982) (ordinance prohibiting camping in public).
263. E.g., Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937 (1lth Cir. 1987); Vehicular Residents
Assoc. v. Agnos, 272 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that ordinance prohibiting sleeping
in cars at night does not violate equal protection rights of poor; applies equally to all who sleep in car);
City of Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
264. See, e.g., Seeley, 655 P.2d at 808; Vehicular Residents Assoc., 272 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
265. See, e.g., Hershey, 834 F.2d at 939 (challenge upheld in part); Parr, 479 P.2d at 358 (holding
that ordinance prohibiting sitting on sidewalks or steps and lying or sitting on lawns violated Equal
Protection Clause because legislative history showed it was targeted against "hippies" because of their
status); Penley, 276 So. 2d at 180 (holding that ordinance prohibiting sleeping in public places was
unconstitutional because it drew no distinction between conduct calculated to harm and conduct that is
essentially innocent; City of Pompano Beach, 455 So. 2d at 471 (holding ordinance prohibiting sleeping
in public to be overbroad because it punishes unoffending behavior; for same reason subject to arbitrary
enforcement).
266. E.g., San Francisco Coalition on Homelessness v. City of San Francisco, Super. Ct. No.
924724 (Ca. Ct. App. 1992); City of Portland v. Johnson, 59 Or. App. 647 (1982) (ordinance
prohibiting camping in public neither vague nor overbroad).
267. 942 F.2d at 20.
268. Id. at 22.
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reasoned that sleeping in public enjoys no constitutional protection, and that the
ordinance was sufficiently clear so as to give notice to potential violators and
to protect against arbitrary enforcement or harassment by police." 9
In contrast, in City of Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, the court invalidated an
ordinance that prohibited sleeping "in, on or about" a motor vehicle as
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.2 70 The court held that the ordinance
was overbroad because it would allow arrest of persons engaged in innocent
conduct. It would cover "a tired child asleep in his car-seat... the alternate
long-distance driver asleep in the bunk of a moving or parked tractor-trailer
... the tired or inebriated driver who has taken widely disseminated good
counsel and chosen to go to sleep in his parked car rather than take his life or
others' lives into his hands." 7' The court held that the ordinance was vague
because it gave "unbridled" enforcement discretion to the police.'a
Some of these cases have reached mixed results. For example, in Hershey
v. Clearwater, plaintiffs challenged an ordinance that made it unlawful to
"lodge or sleep in, or about any" motor vehicle.273 Plaintiffs argued that
sleeping was protected under the Constitution, specifically that sleeping is
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.274 The court did not
reach the question of the constitutionality of the portion of the ordinance
prohibiting sleeping.275 But the court suggested that if the portion of the
ordinance prohibiting sleeping encompassed "innocent nappers" it would be
overbroad.276
2. As-Applied Challenges
More recently, some courts have upheld as-applied challenges to similar
laws on other federal constitutional grounds 7 including violations of the
Eighth Amendment, the right to travel, and the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. 27 Courts have also rejected similar facial, as well as some
269. Id. at 24.
270. 455 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 834 F.2d 937 (1lth Cir. 1987).
274. Id. at 939.
275. Id. at 940 n.5. The court held that even if sleeping is constitutionally protected, the prohibition
on lodging in vehicles in public was a reasonable restriction within the police power of the city;
accordingly, the court upheld the portion of the law prohibiting lodging in vehicles.
276. Id. at n.5.
277. Three of the cases cited-Vehicular Residents Assoc., 272 Cal. Rptr. 216, Seeley, 655 P.2d
803, and Parr, 479 P.2d 353-involved or included Equal Protection Clause challenges; Seeley also
included a right to travel claim. 655 P.2d at 808.
278. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Church v. City of
Huntsville, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993): Tobe v. City of
Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded, 272 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994),judgment
rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
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as-applied, challenges to such laws.279 Pottinger v. City of Miami, probably
the most significant recent case,' has resulted in important court rulings as
well as policy changes by the local county government. Its analysis has been
adopted by other courts; 2sa some courts have specifically rejected the court's
reasoning and conclusions.'
a. Three recent decisions In Pottinger, a plaintiff class of some 6,000
"involuntarily homeless" people living in Miamii challenged the city's
policy and practice of arresting and harassing them for engaging in basic
activities of daily life, such as sleeping and eating, in public.' Plaintiffs
claimed that by arresting them for performing "essential, life-sustaining
activities" such as sleeping, eating, standing and congregating in public the city
was punishing plaintiffs for their "involuntary homeless status" and that this
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that arresting homeless people for the
involuntary public performance of essential activities infringed their fundamen-
tal right to travel.28 Plaintiffs alleged that the city arrested them under a
variety of laws; however, they did not ask the court to invalidate any laws but
rather to enjoin the city from arresting them for innocent conduct that they
were forced to perform in public.'
279. One recent important ruling explicitly relied on this distinction, rejecting a facial challenge to
a law prohibiting camping in public but noting that it may have treated an applied challenge differently.
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1152 (Cal. 1995).
280. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
281. E.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (Eighth Amendment);
Church v. City of Huntsville, No. Civ. A. 93-C-1239-S, 1993 WL 646401 (N.D. Ala. 1993),
preliminary injunction vacated, 30 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Associated Press, Judge:
Homeless Can Stay on Beach, Nov. 22, 1992 (Newswire) (Key West. Florida).
282. Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 856 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Pattonv. Baltimore,
No. S-93-2389, slip op. at 52-53 (D. Md. 1994) (disagreeing with Po'tinger and agreeing with Joyce
that homelessness is not a status "as a matter of law"). The Eleventh Circuit has so far allowed the
ruling to stand, but has avoided ruling on the merits; it may never do so. See Pottinger v. Miami, 40
F.3d 1155 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (remanding case to district court); No. 88-2406-Civ.-CCA (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(ruling on remand); 76 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1996) (order to settle appeal).
283. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1553-54, 1555.
284. 810 F. Supp. at 1554. Plaintiffs claimed this was part of an overall city practice of driving
them from public places. Id.
285. Plaintiffs also raised claims under the Florida constitution and common law. They also alleged
that the city violated the "fundamental" right of homeless people to engage in public in essential
activities such as sleeping, eating, bathing and congregating, that the arrests of homeless people were
pretextual and amounted to unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and that
the city's seizures of plaintiffs' property lacked probable cause, were unreasonable, and violated the
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1555.
286. 810 F. Supp. at 1555. The suit was originally filed in 1988 and proceedings in it have been
lengthy. Plaintiffs first moved for injunctive relief, which the court denied. In 1990, plaintiffs filed a
second request for a preliminary injunction after two incidents in which police awakened and arrested
homeless people sleeping in a park, put their personal belongings into a pile and set them on fire; this
motion was granted. Id. at 1556. In 1991, plaintiffs again sought injunctive relief, following an incident
in which police officers removed homeless people sleeping under a highway overpass and required them
to move to two parks. The court held the city in civil contempt for violating its earlier order. Id. at
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Based on record evidence that the number of shelter beds and other
resources was extremely inadequate relative to the need,2 7 the court found
that the plaintiffs "truly had no place to go." It hdld that the city's practice of
arresting them "for performing essential, life-sustaining acts in public when
they have absolutely no place to go" punished them for their status, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The
court held that the city violated plaintiff's rights under the Equal Protection
Clause, and burdened their right to travel by making it impossible for them to
remain in or enter the city.s It also held that the city violated their proce-
dural due process rights by arresting them when they were not in violation of
any laws.2
9
In Johnson v. City of Dallas, a class of homeless plaintiffs challenged that
city's enforcement of a series of laws against them, including a prohibition on
sleeping in public.2"o The court found based on the record evidence that there
were insufficient shelter beds to meet the need. Agreeing with Pottinger, the
court held that punishing the homeless plaintiffs for sleeping in public when
they had nowhere else to go punished their involuntary status, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. However, disagreeing with Pottinger, the court found
no right to travel violation. The court held that the right to travel only prohibits
differential treatment of residents and non-residents, and that since no such
differential treatment was at issue there was no violation. 291
In Joyce v. City of San Francisco, a class of homeless plaintiffs2'9
1556. Later in 1991, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the city from closing a park and the area under the
highway overpass, primary living areas for homeless people. The court denied the request based on the
city's representation that it would offer comparable or better "housing" to those displaced. Id. at 1557.
287. Id. at 1558. The court rejected the malicious abuse of process claim, as well as the claim that
the arrests were pretextual. Id. at 1568-69. The court upheld the claim that the city unlawfully seized
and took plaintiffs' property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1571-73. The court also
upheld plaintiffs' procedural due process claim. The court distinguished this case from the Eleventh
Circuit's statement in Hershey v. Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1987), atPottinger, 810 F. Supp.
at 1577, that sleeping "of the general kind" is not constitutionally protected, noting that the protection
arose only because of plaintiffs' particular circumstances. Id.
288. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that they were a "suspect class," noting that the Supreme
Court has held repeatedly that the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that classifications based on
"'wealth alone'" are not suspect. Id. at 1578, and cases cited therein. However, the court did note that
it was not "entirely convinced that homelessness as a class" has none of the "'traditional indicia of
suspectness.'" Id., quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
289. The court granted plaintiffs' motion to bifurcate the trial, with the first part, considering only
liability, to be tried without a jury and the second part (if liability was found), considering damages, to
be tried by a jury. Potninger, 810 F. Supp. at 1557.
290. 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing ongrounds
that named plaintiffs did not have standing because there was no evidence they had actually been
convicted under challenged laws).
291. The court also held that homeless people do not constitute a suspect class. The court relied
on prior cases considering the issue, although it noted that the authority is not "voluminous." 860 F.
Supp. at 355.
292. The class was defined as those persons in the city who "(1) are without shelter, lack the
financial resources or mental capacity necessary to provide for their own shelter, and have been cited
or arrested for a violation of any of the portions of the Matrix program now challenged." Joyce v. City
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challenged the application of a series of ordinances against them as part of a
concerted city effort to remove them from the city.2" They also alleged that
they were cited or rousted even when they were not violating any ordi-
nance;294 and that they are also regularly ordered to move on, without being
arrested. 2' Plaintiffs alleged that these city policies and practices violated the
Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.296 The city conceded
that shelter space was insufficient.2' Disagreeing with Pottinger and John-
son, the court held that homelessness is not a status and that the ordinances
punished acts, not conduct; it held that there was therefore no Eighth
Amendment violation.29 Further disagreeing with Pottinger and agreeing
with Johnson, the court ruled that because the laws did not discriminate
between residents and non-residents, they did not violate the right to
travel.
299
b. The Eighth Amendment The differences in the rulings on the Eighth
Amendment claims can be traced to different interpretations of two Supreme
Court cases: Robinson v. State of Califoia and Powell v. TeRas.30  In
Robinson, the Court held that a state statute that made being addicted to
of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994), Class Certification Order, slip op. at 2 (Aug.
4, 1994).
293. Citing city testimony and documents, plaintiffs alleged that the Mayor had adopted a policy
priority to make the city "inhospitable to homeless people." Appellant's Brief at 6, Joyce v. City of San
Francisco, No. 95-16940 (9th Cir.) (filed 1996). Plaintiffs also relied on evidence that the city instructed
its officials to "get rid of" organizations providing food to homeless people, offered one-way tickets out
of town to homeless people, closed half of its shelter facilities, and confiscated and destroyed the
property of homeless people. As part of this effort, and to "get around" constitutional limitations on
enforcing vagrancy laws, the mayor's office asked city departments to identify ordinances that could be
used "to obtain order and accountability on the part of homeless individuals who people the streets."
One memo from a police captain advocated a "no tolerance program" to deal with "filth, flea infested,
desease [sic] ridden people." Id. at 8.
294. Under the city's "Matrix" program, police enforced some 18 ordinances including prohibitions
on being in parks at night, "camping" in parks at any time, "lodging" in any public place, and
"obstructing" sidewalks; plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances were being enforced in a targeted
manner against them. Violations of ordinances under the Matrix program are punishable by fines of at
least $76 per infraction as well as jail terms. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 848-49. In two and a half years of
enforcement under the Matrix ordinance, 5700 citations have been issued. Appellant's Brief at 10, Joyce
v. City of San Francisco, No. 95-16940 (9th Cir.) (filed 1996).
295. Id.
296. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the
California constitution. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 861, 863.
297. The City estimates that there were between 11,000 to 16,000 homeless people in the city at
any given time, and that there were only 1,395 shelter beds and 798 transitional housing units. MAYOR'S
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, MAYOR'S OFFICE OF HOUSING, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO 1995 CONSOLIDATED PLAN (1994). In addition, there were 9085 on the waiting list for
housing assistance as of December 1994, and income assistance available to homeless people was $345
per month, not sufficient to rent an apartment or room. Id.
298. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843 (denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction).
299. The case is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Joyce, No. 95-16940, Docket No. CV-93-
04149-DJJ.
300. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
301. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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narcotics a crime imposed cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.3°2 Following a factual inquiry, the Court found that
"narcotic addiction is an illness" that "apparently ... may be contracted
innocently or involuntarily." The Court concluded that the statute punished the
"status" of being addicted in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 03
In Powell, the Court considered a law that penalized getting or being drunk
in public. The Court undertook an extensive factual inquiry into alcoholism and
public drunkenness. A plurality of the Court was "unable to conclude, on the
basis of this record or on the current state of medical knowledge, that chronic
alcoholics in general . . . suffer from. . . such an irresistible compulsion to
drink and get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control their
performance of either or both of these acts ..... 14 The Court held that the
statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 5
Significantly, Justice White, who cast the fifth and deciding vote to uphold
the statute, 3 6 cautioned against "preoccupation" with any distinction between
"status" and "conduct. "3" Noting that the difference between status and act
is temporal-"being" drunk may occur within five minutes after "getting"
drunk-he argued that predicating a constitutional standard on this distinction
was inappropriate. 0 8 Instead, he focused on whether what was punished was
volitional-and thus within the power of the defendant to avoid or not-as a
matter of fact. 9 Whether or not Powell could have resisted the urge to
drink, "he had a home," and "nothing in the record indicates that he could not
have done his drinking in private." In these circumstances the defendant's
drinking in public was voluntary and so could constitutionally be punished.310
302. 370 U.S. 660, 666-67.
303. 392 U.S. at 667. The Court cited a variety of medical books and journals in support of this
view. Id. at n.9. The Court also noted that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a
punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even
one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Id. at 667.
304. Id. at 535. The plurality in Powell treated this as a factual inquiry and went to considerable
lengths discussing whether and to what extent alcoholism is voluntary or not, reviewing both the record
and a variety of medical writings. Indeed, the Court drew distinctions between "compulsions" and
"impulses" in assessing different levels of voluntariness. Id. at 531-37.
305. Id. at 531-37. The holding in Robinson is the basis for the principle that status may not be
punished; the holding in Powell is the basis for its purported corollary that conduct may be punished.
306. Justice White's opinion in Powell is controlling precedent. See Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that narrowest basis for decision controls when fragmented court decides
case and no single rationale is adopted by majority).
307. Powell, 392 U.S. at 550 n.2.
308. Id.
309. For Eighth Amendment purposes "[t]he proper subject of inquiry is whether volitional acts
brought about the 'condition' and whether those acts are sufficiently proximate to the "condition" for
it to be permissible to impose penal sanctions on the condition." Id. at 550 nn.2 & 4. For example,
according to this analysis punishing an alcoholic for drinking would not be permitted if the drinking
being punished was not volitional and if any initial act of volitional drinking was not "proximate" to the
act being punished.
310. Id.
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Justice White specifically stated that his conclusion would have been
different had the defendant not had a home:
Although many chronics have homes, many others do not. For all practical
purposes the public streets may be home for these unfortunates, not because their
disease compels them to be there, but because, drunk or sober, they have no place
else to go and no place else to be when they are drinking. This is more a function
of economic station than of disease, although the disease may lead to destitution and
perpetuate that condition.... As applied to them this statute is in effect a law
which bans a single act for which they may not be convicted under the Eighth
Amendment-the act of getting drunk." 31'
In the context of laws penalizing homeless people for sleeping in public, the
relevant inquiry is whether that activity is voluntary or not. Clearly, sleeping
itself is not: unlike drinking or taking narcotics, which may be unavoidable for
alcoholics or addicts, sleeping is necessary for all human beings. Determining
whether sleeping in public can be avoided requires a factual inquiry, the same
inquiry made by Justice White when he argued that if "a showing can be made
. . . that avoiding public places when intoxicated is... impossible" then such
laws would violate the Eighth Amendment.
312
In Pottinger, the court's ruling was based on three key factual findings.
First, the court found based on expert testimony that homeless persons "rarely,
if ever," choose to be homeless, and that instead people become homeless
because of a financial crisis or because of physical or mental illness. 3 3 Based
on the testimony, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were homeless
involuntarily. Second, the court found that at the time of trial the city had
fewer than 700 shelter beds available for some 6,000 homeless people, and that
most homeless people were unable to turn to family or friends for assis-
tance.3 4 Therefore, the city could not argue persuasively that the homeless
plaintiffs had made a deliberate choice to live in public places or that their
decision to sleep in the park as opposed to some other exposed place could be
311. Id. at 551, 553 (White, J., concurring). Justice White noted that in addition to having a home,
the defendant also had a wife. Id. at 552.
312. Id. at 551.
313. Potinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1557. It noted that the lack of low-income housing was a significant
factor contributing to homelessness as well. The court reasoned that a person who loses his home due
to economic hard times or illness "exercises no more control over these events than he would over a
natural disaster." Id. at 1564. It also reasoned, based on expert testimony, that the problems faced by
homeless people, such as substance abuse and joblessness, are "both a cause and a consequence" of
homelessness. Id. at 1558.
314. Id. at 1564. The court noted that an expert witness had testified that of the 700, 200 were
.program beds" with special eligibility criteria, and thus not available to all homeless people. Id. The
court also found that homeless people are socially isolated and do not generally have friends or family
who can take them in. Id. at 1563. In addition, the court found that many forms of government
assistance are unavailable to homeless people, many of whom are not eligible for any income assistance.
Id. at 1564. As a result, the court concluded that "[e]xcept for a fortunate few, most homeless
individuals have no alternative to living in public areas." Id. at 1558.
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considered a "volitional act."315 Third, the court considered the conduct
being punished: "essential, life-sustaining" activities such as sleeping and
eating.316 The court noted that plaintiffs were not challenging arrests for
harmful conduct, and that "resisting the need to eat, sleep or engage in other
life-sustaining activities is impossible."
317
Based on these findings, the court concluded that "the harmless conduct"
for which plaintiffs were being arrested was "inseparable from their involun-
tary condition of being homeless." 318  Consequently, arresting homeless
people for harmless acts they are forced to perform in public effectively
punished them for being homeless.319 The court held that "[a]s long as the
homeless plaintiffs do not have a single place where they can lawfully be, the
challenged ordinances, as applied to them, effectively punish them for
something for which they may not be convicted under the Eighth Amend-
ment-sleeping, eating, and other innocent conduct. "32
Similarly, in Johnson v. City of Dallas the court found that the evidence
before it demonstrated that there were not enough shelter beds in the city to
accommodate the demand for them. The court also found that "for a number
of Dallas homeless at this time homelessness is involuntary and irremediable.
They have no place to go other than the public lands they live on. In other
words, they must be in public. And it is also clear that they must sleep. "321
The court concluded that in these circumstances punishing plaintiffs for
sleeping in public punished them for their involuntary status, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.3z
The court stated that "a critical distinction exists between status and
act." 31 Still, the "status of being" clearly could not be criminalized:
"Because being does not exist without sleeping, criminalizing the latter
necessarily punishes the homeless because of their status as homeless, a status
315. Id. at 1565.
316. City records indicated that most of the persons arrested were not disorderly, were not involved
in any "drug activity," and did not "pose any apparent harm to anyone." Id. at 1560. Indeed, in many
cases the persons arrested were asleep. Id.
317. Id. at 1565.
318. Id. at 1564.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1565.
321. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
322. Id. The court held that the other laws, which prohibited removing waste from trash receptacles
and trespassing, did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 349-50. The court also noted it concern
that accepting the argument that these acts are "the necessary correlative of homelessness would be to
create a class of persons who are constitutionally immune from much of the criminal law." Id. Further,
the court noted, this could lead to "rationaliz[ing] constitutional protection for stealing food or clothing."
Id. at 350. The court however, noted that "[r]easonable minds could differ over the wisdom of
criminaizing the conduct of a hungry man trying to feed himself by foraging through abandoned
property in hopes of finding food thrown out by a restaurant or grocery store at the end of the day's
business." Id. at 350, n.5. However, the court stated this was a matter for the legislature, not the courts.
Id. See also Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1991).
323. Id. at 349 (agreeing with Joyce, but disagreeing on significance).
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forcing them to be in public."324 The court rejected the city's contention that
status may not be a "function of the discretionary acts of others;" in other
words, that status could not depend on whether or not the city had provided
sufficient shelter beds.3"6 The court noted that the city could redress the
ordinance's unconstitutionality by providing some place for homeless people
to be other than public places. However, the court emphasized that it was not
requiring the city to provide any aid, but rather that "so long as the homeless
have no other place to be, they may not be prevented from sleeping in
public. "326
Because "status" may suggest immutability, a court may hesitate to adopt
such a designation.327 For example, the Joyce court said that granting
homelessness "the protection of status" would have "staggering" effects
because it would provide "constitutional protection to any condition over which
a showing could be made that the defendant had no control."32 Given its
adoption of the status versus conduct paradigm, the court apparently assumed
that holding otherwise would require granting unconditional "protection" to
anyone coming within the designation "homeless," no matter the circumstanc-
es. 3
29
Focusing instead on whether punishment is being imposed on acts that are
volitional-as a matter of fact-is a more straightforward task with a more
limited result. This is a factual inquiry that may vary from city to city and
within the same city at different times. As such the constitutional "protection"
it offers is limited to the relatively few cases where punishment is imposed for
324. Id. at 350 ("It seems that situation would put one in the position of a Mr. Powell, who could
be punished for conduct not inextricably intertwined with status.").
325. The court's response does not directly address the city's point, which seems to be that status
must be immutable. However, this view is not supported by Robinson or Powell. See discussion infra.
326. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 351.
327. A similar concern may explain the Powell plurality's discussion of its reluctance to endorse
a "constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility." Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 534 (1968). This
formulation suggests that the plurality had in mind categories of "conditions" that would as a
constitutional matter preclude criminal sanction, as opposed to a principle which when applied would
lead to outcomes dependent on the particular facts in a particular record. If the relevant question is
considered to depend on particular facts, however, this concern should be obviated: rather than create
a new "constitutional doctrine," under this approach a court simply applies existing doctrine-the Eighth
Amendment's constraints on criminal law-to a particular fact pattern.
328. The court also dismissed as irrelevant plaintiffs' contention that the city failed to provide
sufficient housing because "status cannot be defined as a function of the discretionary acts of another."
Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843,857 (N.D. Cal. 1994). This suggests a view of status
that is inherent and immutable. Analytical concerns aside, the concept of "status" as a designation of
immutable characteristics may be becoming obsolete. Even qualities such as race and gender may
become less than fixed, either physically (e.g., transsexuals, mixed race people) or socially (as
hopefully, they stop being a basis for differential treatment, possibly to be replaced by other bases).
329. It provided no explanation for its different conclusions concerning the involuntariness of
addiction as opposed to homelessness; indeed, the court suggested that its views on addiction would be
different as well were it not for Robinson. Id. The Joyce court dismissed as dicta Justice White's
discussion of his different view of the constitutionality of punishing Powell had he been homeless, and
did not otherwise discuss Justice White's opinion. Id.
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necessary, involuntary activities that cannot be avoided.33° An analysis based
on whether punishment is being imposed for conduct that could have been
avoided is also more closely tailored to the principles underlying the Eighth
Amendment's protections.331
The Pottinger analysis suggests a three part test for conducting this inquiry.
First, are plaintiffs involuntarily homeless? Second, do plaintiffs have available
to them nonpublic places to carry out the punished activities? Third, are the
activities being punished involuntary? If the answer to each part of the inquiry,
based on the facts, is affirmative, then under Powell the imposition of
punishment in those circumstances violates the Eighth Amendment.
c. The Right to Travel While the right to travel is not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, 332 it has long been recognized by the
Supreme Court as a "fundamental," constitutionally protected right. 333 The
Court has described the right as the "free[dom] to travel throughout the length
and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules or regulations which
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." 334 However, the Court has
also stated that the right does not protect "merely" movement 35 but rather
includes a right to settle and abide in a place.
336
In addition, and more broadly, the Court has recognized a "right of
locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to
330. In the absence of widespread, severe deprivation, this should encompass a relatively narrow
universe; in the event of massive deprivation, a broader universe is appropriate.
331. This focus is compatible with the view that deterrence is a primary goal of punishment, since
that which is unavoidable will not be deterred by being punished. It is consistent with the view that the
goal of punishment is retribution, to the extent that society does not want to exact retribution for
unavoidable and otherwise innocent acts. See Note, Toward A ConstitutionalDefinition of Punishment,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1980) (discussing theories of punishment). For a related discussion of a
duress defense to criminalization efforts, see David M. Smith, Note, A Theoretical andLegal Challenge
to Homeless Criminalization as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 487 (1994).
332. The Court has suggested that this is because the right is "so elementary" that it is necessarily
implicit in the Constitution, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); it has also said that the right
derives from "the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty."
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 624 (1969). At times the Court has suggested a variety of sources
for the right, including the Privileges and Immunities Clause, United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281
(1920); and the Commerce Clause, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Passenger Cases, 49
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). Justice Brennan has cited the Equal Protection Clause, Attorney General v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898,902 n.2 (1986) (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan,
J., concurring)), and the Due Process Clause, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
333. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and cases cited therein. For a discussion of
the nature and origin of the right to travel and its application to laws prohibiting sleeping in public, see
Paul Ades, The Unconstitutionality of "Anti-Homeless" Laws, 77 CAL. L. REv. 595 (1989).
334. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
335. Id.
336. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-63 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to enter and abide); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281,297-98 (1920)
(Court recognized longstanding "right of citizens of the United States to reside peacefully in, and have
free ingress into and egress from, the several states").
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inclination."337 Recently, noting that the "constitutional right to freedom of
movement" was implicated, 338 the Court struck down a loitering statute
requiring persons "loiter[ing]" or "wander[ing]" on the streets to produce
identification.339 In an earlier decision, striking down a law prohibiting
loitering, the Court noted that "wander[ing]" and "stroll[ing]" are "historically
part of the amenities of life."
3
1
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the right to travel
includes the right to travel intrastate as well as interstate,341 a number of
lower federal as well as state courts have specifically so held. 342 For exam-
ple, in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority,343 the Second
Circuit invalidated as violative of the right to travel a county requirement that
applicants for state-subsidized public housing have lived in the county for a
year. The Court held that the right to travel includes the right to intrastate
travel, reasoning that a contrary holding would lead to an absurd result:
applicants moving to the county from out of state would be protected from the
rule while state residents moving from another county would not be protect-
ed.
3 44
State action may impinge on the right to travel in three separate ways.'
First, action that "actually deters" travel impinges on the right. For example,
a state durational residency requirement for welfare benefits "actually deters"
travel because an indigent "will doubtless hesitate" to migrate knowing that if
she needs assistance in her first year she will be unable to get it.' Second,
state action impinges on the right when impeding travel is its "primary
objective." Examples include laws intended to discourage the "in-migration of
indigents" or to "fence out" indigents seeking to move in specifically for
higher welfare benefits.3 7 Third, state action that uses "any classification
337. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
338. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (holding statute was facially vague in violation of
Due Process Clause).
339. Id.
340. Papacbristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
341. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 255-56. Some early formulations define the right as being able
to travel as freely outside one's state as within it, see Passenger Cases, 49 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492
(1844), suggesting an implicit acknowledgement of such a right. In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), the Court noted that, "a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the
right of interstate travel. . . ." Bray, 506 U.S. at 277; however, it was considering whether the right
to interstate travel was violated, not whether a right to interstate travel exists. Id.
342. E.g., King v. New Rochelle, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 410 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1975).
343. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
344. 442 F.2d at 648 n.6.
345. Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986) (citations omitted).
346. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1968). See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903 (citing
Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 and Crandall v. Nevada, 74 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 46 (1867) for the "actually
deters" prong of the right to travel test).
347. Shapiro, 414 U.S. at 628-31.
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which serves to penalize the exercise" of the right impinges on it. 48 Even a
temporary deprivation of a "very important" benefit, including welfare benefits
needed to procure the "necessities of life," medical care, or the right to vote,
"penalizes" travel."49 State action that impinges on the right must be narrow-
ly tailored to serve a "compelling" state interest in order to pass constitutional
muster.350
Applying these principles, the Pottinger court held that the city's
enforcement of laws to prevent homeless people from sleeping in public, in the
absence of any alternative, required them either to leave the city or to face
arrest.35' The court concluded that in these circumstances the city's policies
toward homeless people implicated their right to both intrastate and interstate
travel, as well as their right to freedom of movement. 5 2 The court held that
these policies violated the right under each of the three independent prongs of
traditional right to travel analysis. 35 3 First, the city's actions imposed a
penalty by denying a "necessity of life"-sleep-to homeless people traveling
into or seeking to remain in Miami. 34 In addition, the city's actions deterred
travel within the city of homeless people already there, and deterred others
from entering the city.355 Finally, the court found that the city intended to
expel homeless people from the city.
356
348. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972)
(quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969))).
349. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 907 (discussing Dunn, 405 U.S. at 330 (striking down durational
residency requirement for voting eligibility); Shapiro, 394 U.S. 61 (1969) (striking down durational
residence requirement for welfare assistance); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974) (striking down durational residence requirement for free medical care)). State action that imposes
a permanent deprivation of a "substantial" benefit such as civil service employment also impinges on
the right. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 907, 908 (discussing Hooper v. Bemalillo, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)
(striking down a permanent tax exemption); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (striking down
dividend payments from natural resources)).
350. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904. This is the language of equal protection review, which the Court
applies where the third form of impingement is present-using a classification that serves to penalize
travel-because challenges to such restrictions typically arise in the equal protection context. The court
also noted that "regardless of the label the standard of review is the same." Id. at 904 n.4.
351. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
352. Id. at 1579.
353. Id. at 1580-81.
354. Id. at 1580.
355. Id. at 1581.
356. Id. at 1566. Other courts have followed similar reasoning. E.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that normal public policy purposes were
actually "a transparent manifestation of [a policy] to expel the homeless."), superseded, 272 P.2d 559
(Cal. 1994),judgmentrev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995). The court held that the city's practice infringed
on plaintiffs' fundamental right to travel and hence must be "strictly scrutinized" and "narrowly
tailored." under the equal protection clause. The court noted that the city had advanced no "compelling
interest" that its practice was "narrowly tailored" to serve. Accordingly, its actions could not pass
constitutional muster under the equal protection clause. Id.
The Pottinger court rejected plaintiffs' claim that they are a "suspect class'" noting that the Supreme
Court has held repeatedly that classifications based on "wealth alone" are not suspect. 810 F. Supp. at
1578. (citing Kademas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (differing effects on poor
not subject to strict scrutiny); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (financial need not suspect
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Other courts have rejected this analysis.3 7 These courts have relied on
three key-but flawed-considerations. First, they have held that in order to
implicate the right to travel state action must treat residents and non-residents
differently." However, the right to travel is a fundamental "personal right,"
not simply a right not to be treated differently; 59 the right protects against
both the "erection of actual barriers" to travel and being "treated different-
ly. "360 Courts holding that differential treatment of residents and non-
residents is required have apparently conflated right to travel and equal
protection analysis. This may be because several important Supreme Court
right to travel cases have involved durational residency requirements which by
definition treat residents and non-residents differently. 61 Because they
distinguished between classes of people, these cases were analyzed under the
Equal Protection Clause; the right to travel was relevant to the "fundamental
right" prong of that analysis.362 Differential treatment is not required,
however, to implicate the right to travel. 363
Second, courts rejecting homeless plaintiffs' right to travel claims have
been concerned that recognizing the right would entail recognizing other rights
as well. For example, in Joyce, the court noted that there is no fundamental
right to sleep. Similarly, in Tobe v. Santa Ana the California Supreme Court
noted that the creation or recognition of a constitutional right to travel does not
impose an obligation on a state to provide the means to enjoy the right, noting
that there is no constitutional right to housing.
These formulations suggest a basic misconception of the issues. An
class); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (filing fees held not suspect); Kreimer v. Bureau
of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 n.6 (3d Cir. 1992) (homeless are not suspect
class)). However, the court did not that it was not "entirely convinced that homelessness as a class" has
none of the "'traditional indicia of suspectness.'" Poringer, 810 F. Supp. at 1578, (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
357. Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Johnson v. City of
Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), aft'd, 64 U.S.L.W. 2598 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996) (rejecting facial challenge); Tobe v.
City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded, 272 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994),
judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
358. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 354, citing Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S.
898 (1986); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
359. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920).
360. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993).
361. See supra note 349.
362. By classifying based on recency of arrival in a place, such laws necessarily both create
classifications and affect travel. Moreover, in Soto-Lopez, the Court suggested in dicta that the Equal
Protection Clause may be the source of the right, citing earlier opinions applying the right to durational
residency requirements. However, it appears that while the Court has analyzed alleged violations of this
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause-which requires strict scrutiny where fundamental
rights are impinged, it has not located the source of the right in that Clause. Compare Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. at 907, with cases cited supra note 349.
363. The Tobe court recognized that differential treatment was not required outside of the equal
protection context. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 394 n. 1 (1994), superseded by
272 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994), judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
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obligation not to penalize or prevent the exercise of a right is different from an
affirmative obligation to provide assistance.31 Recognition of the right would
not require a city to provide housing or to ensure that homeless people have
a place to sleep." Rather, it would prevent enforcement of a law when that
law burdens the constitutional right.
Finally, courts rejecting homeless plaintiffs' right to travel claims have
ruled that the public place restrictions did not create a direct barrier to travel
but rather had an incidental impact which may make it more difficult for
some-such as homeless people-to establish residence in the given city; the
courts noted that the purpose of the laws was not to deter travel. 36 For
example, in Johnson v. City of Dallas, the court stated that if the ordinances
deterred anyone from moving to Dallas they did so only in the "same sense
that anti-smoking ordinances or laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol in certain
areas might deter smokers or drinkers from migrating to particular areas."367
According to the court, "any law might arguably affect one's determination to
remain or leave. "3" Accordingly, the court found no violation of the right
to travel.
As applied to homeless persons with no other alternative, however, some
public place restrictions erect a very direct barrier to the right to travel and to
"freedom of movement." Laws and policies that prevent sleeping in public,
when there is no other place for them to sleep, require homeless persons to
leave. It is difficult to imagine a more direct barrier than expulsion. Courts
holding otherwise appear to have wanted to avoid a result under which any law
that burdens a group of people by making it difficult for them to remain in the
city could implicate the right to travel. But making it impossible to live in a
given place is different from merely making it more difficult. Expulsion-state
action that requires residents to leave the jurisdiction by making it impossible
to remain-clearly implicates their right to travel.
More difficult are cases involving narrower restrictions that make
remaining in the jurisdiction difficult but arguably not impossible. 69 For
364. InMaricopa County, for example, the Court did not consider whether or decide that in general
governments must provide any "necessitates of life," but simply that such a benefit-already
provided-could not be withheld based on a durational residency requirement. Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
365. A city might argue that in practice non-enforcement of such laws against homeless people
would result in turning over certain public areas to homeless people. However, this is not the same as
creating a legal "right" to sleep in public, and it does not necessarily follow from this reasoning. It is
not the only option available to cities; they could also establish alternatives for their homeless residents.
Further, in practice enforcement will also result in at least some homeless people living on the streets,
in the absence of any alternative, and especially if neighboring localities establish similar policies.
366. Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 860-61 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
367. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 354 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
368. Id.
369. The trend appears to be toward increasingly narrower restrictions; it includes "pedestrian
interference" ordinances. E.g., BALTIMORE, MD. DISTCr OF COLUMBIA AcT 10-98 (1995);
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example, Seattle's "sidewalk" ordinance bans sitting or lying on sidewalks in
downtown and other specified commercial zones between the hours of 7 a.m.
and 9 p.m.3 70 This imposes a much more limited prohibition than, for
example, a broad ban on sleeping in public. But by preventing their access to
needed resources-such as food pantries, medical clinics, and other services,
located in the downtown area-it may also make impossible homeless persons'




Less drastically, the ordinance may restrict them to certain places and
times. 373 This may also implicate the right to travel by restricting homeless
persons' freedom of movement to those areas and times.
374
d. Remedies In fashioning relief, the Pottinger court ordered the city to
create two "safe zones," public areas where homeless people would not be
arrested for harmless, life-sustaining acts.375 While not expressly stated, the
judge's reasoning may have been that such zones would constitute places where
homeless people could "go," thus altering the context and curing the constitu-
tional violationY.3 6 This remedy may raise its own constitutional difficulties,
and at least one suit has challenged "safe zones" created in a different
jurisdiction.3"
CINCNmATI, OH, Improper Solicitation Ordinance, modifying provisions of CINCNNATi, OH. CITY
CODE Ch. 904, § 910 (1995); Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 113697 (Oct. 28, 1987), adding 12A.12.015
to SEATrLE, WASH. CITY CODE Chapter 12.12, Code ch. 12A.12.015 (1987).
370. Persons sitting at cafes, at bus stops while waiting for the bus, and on chairs provided by
commercial establishments are specifically exempted from the ban. See Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850
F. Supp. 1442, 1444-45 (W.D. Wa. 1994), aff'd, 64 U.S.L.W. 2598 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996).
371. Because they generally cannot afford to pay for transportation, homeless people are likely to
have to walk there, to become tired, and to need to rest. This is especially likely to be so for the
significant proportions who are disabled or who are children. At the same time, they are unable to afford
to sit down in restaurants, cafes, or other commercial establishments. They are thus likely to need to
sit on public sidewalks to rest. The inability to do so may preclude them from traveling to the downtown
area and to necessary survival resources such as food and health care. See National Law Center on
Homelessness & Poverty, Brief of Amicus Curiae, Roulette, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (describing plaintiffs'
affidavits).
372. In Roulette, the court rejected plaintiffs' right to travel challenge to the ordinance, ruling that
the ordinance did not impede migration into commercial areas because it did not make it impossible to
carry out essential activities there but rather only prohibited sitting or lying at certain times. Roulette,
850 F. Supp. at 1442. The court did not address plaintiffs' preclusion from essential services.
373. The result is akin to reverse safe zones, defining by omission places and times where homeless
people may carry out necessary life activities.
374. This argument does not appear to have been made, nor was it addressed, in Roulette.
375. The remedy has been controversial, and criticized publicly by some, including this author. A
Fort Lauderdale suit has challenged that city's "safe zones" as a "sanitary nuisance" and a violation of
the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs' Complaint, McElroy v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, (No. 94-6266) (filed March 30, 1994) (S.D. Fla. 1994).
376. Following the Pottinger court's ruling, Dallas considered creating open airpavilions inan area
outside downtown where homeless people would be allowed to sleep on the floor. Homeless people not
in the pavilions would be subject to arrest for sleeping in public. Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 940,871 (Feb.
23, 1994) (proposed but not adopted). This was apparently intended to address constitutional concerns
by providing some areas for homeless people to "be" and to carry out essential life-sustaining activities.
377. See McElroy v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 94-6266 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Homelessness and Its Criminalization
While they do provide a place to be, safe zones also restrict homeless
people to those areas, narrowly limiting their ability to move about the city,
and thus potentially infringing upon their right to travel. Further, essentially
confining homeless people to specific zones may impose some standard of care
on the city for those so confined, raising issues of adequacy of conditions
within the zones. Establishing safe zones-and requiring homeless people to be
in them in order to avoid arrest for the essential acts of living-may require
cities to meet minimal levels of safety and sanitation.
In contrast, in Johnson v. City of Dallas the court simply enjoined
enforcement of the anti-sleeping ordinance. The court did not order any
affirmative relief. But the court specifically noted that if in the future sufficient
shelter beds became available so that homeless Dallas residents in fact had an
alternative to sleeping in public then the outcome of the constitutional analysis
would be different: "One way to remove the impediment to that ordinance's
enforcement... would be for [homeless persons] to have some place to be
other than in public .... But as long as homeless persons must live in public,
their sleeping may not be constitutionally criminalized."378
C. A Summary, and Some Conclusions
Broad bans on begging in all public areas are unlikely to be upheld.
Targeted bans on "aggressive" begging are also subject to invalidation as
content-based restrictions under both the First Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clauses.379 Bans on "aggressive solicitation" are more likely to be
upheld if they apply to all solicitation and are construed to ban conduct that is
already covered by existing laws such as prohibitions on assault and battery.
Consequently, restrictions that are constitutional are likely to be duplicative of
existing laws.3s Essentially, to be constitutional, restrictions on begging must
not be recognizable as such. If the goal of such restrictions, however, is
specifically to stop beggars from begging in public areas, then restrictions that
are constitutional will likely be ineffective in meeting that goal.
Public place restrictions are more likely to withstand facial challenges than
challenges to their application to homeless people. Courts have disagreed in
their treatment of as applied challenges based on different interpretations of
Eighth Amendment and right to travel principles.
Disagreement on the Eighth Amendment claims turns on the "status-
378. Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 351 (N.D. Tex. 1994) ("It seems that situation
would put one in the position of a Mr. Powell, who could be punished for conduct not inextricably
intertwined in a status.").
379. They may also raise enforcement concerns, inviting targeting of begging and beggars. See
Patton v. Baltimore, No. 8-93-2389 (D.Md. Aug. 19, 1994), slip op. at 45-48, and discussion supra.
380. Even narrow restrictions may be unconstitutional if they apply only to begging and not to other
forms of solicitation. See, e.g., Patton, Civ. No. S-93-2389, slip op. at 65-67.
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conduct" dichotomy. Courts reluctant to designate homelessness as a "status"
have assumed that status is a rigid concept that confers unconditional,
presumably lasting protection from otherwise applicable laws. This concept
should be rejected, in favor of a fact-based approach focused on whether a
given activity is voluntary or involuntary in a given jurisdiction during the
relevant period of time. Under this approach, the availability of nonpublic
places to homeless people for sleep and other life-necessities is of paramount
importance. In the absence of such alternatives, criminal penalties on activities
such as sleeping in public-as applied to homeless people-is cruel and unusual
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This approach allows for a changed
result based on changed facts, and does not grant "unconditional protection"
for all time and in all circumstances. It also focuses on conditions-which may
change-rather than on permanent personal traits.38'
Disagreement on right to travel claims turns on whether the right is viewed
as only protecting against differential treatment of residents as opposed to non-
residents. Here the underlying concern appears to be establishing limits, so that
not every burden on living in a jurisdiction implicates the right to travel.
Impossibility can help define a limit. A burden that as a matter of fact makes
remaining in the jurisdiction impossible should implicate the right. Preclusion
of a necessary life activity such as sleep should meet a test of impossibility.
Because this is a factual inquiry, results are subject to change based on changed
facts.
Where alternatives are available, constitutional concerns should be cured.
If given alternatives, however, few homeless people are likely to live in public
places. The constitutional cure thus appears to remove, in large part, the need
for such bans.3" In the absence of alternatives, therefore, public place
restrictions are likely to be unconstitutional; given alternatives, they are likely
to be moot.
"Safe zones" can also cure constitutional concerns by providing places for
homeless people to "be."" Nonetheless, they raise their own difficul-
ties.3" As a constitutional matter, the restrictions implicate right to travel and
freedom of movement concerns. Furthermore, the conditions within them may
implicate the Due Process Clause. As a policy matter, they serve to isolate
homeless people further, impeding their escape from homelessness.
381. A sophisticated grasp of "status" may also operate in this way. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 350,
is a good example. Such an approach defines status based on particular facts, which may change. In
addition, as discussed supra, a rigid distinction between status and conduct is largely untenable.
382. This is not to suggest that there may not be some people who, whether homeless or not, and
for whatever reason, may voluntarily choose to live outdoors; a jurisdiction may wish to pursue public
place restrictions to address this possibility.
383. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
384. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, McElroy v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 94-6266 (S.D. Fla.
1994).
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IV. CAUSES OF CRIMINAIZATION: LAW AND POLICY
Commentators often assume that the increase in criminalizing actions by
city governments is fueled by a public "backlash" against homeless people."
Local officials, sometimes also citing public opinion, generally outline
aesthetic, health, and safety concerns in justifying the need for criminalizing
measures. Such concerns may stand alone or they may be coupled with a stated
goal of removing homeless people from all or part of the city; in some cases
that goal is the primary or only reason for a given city policy. In addition,
preventing urban decay and the commission of serious crimes are also cited.
This Part reviews and discusses causes of and justifications for criminalizing
responses to homelessness.
A. Public Opinion
Commentators have attributed the recent trend toward criminalization to a
"backlash" by the public against homeless people. They argue that public
sympathy for homeless people is waning, and that the public now simply wants
to reclaim its public places. While during the 1980s the public was "sympa-
thetic" to the plight of the homeless, it is said that the public now suffers from
"compassion fatigue." In some cases, this argument is combined with claims
that homeless people are not in fact sympathetic, but rather blameworthy
persons-such as drug addicts-who somehow chose their plight. The public
may have had some indulgence for them in the past-or been deceived as to
their true nature. Having run out of patience or learned the truth, however, the
public will no longer put up with them. Hence, criminalization.
386
Public opinion polls, however, do not support the view that the public is
not sympathetic to homeless people. A December 1995 Gallup poll on public
attitudes on homelessness found that 86% of the public are sympathetic to
homeless people, and that 33% report that they feel more sympathy now than
they did five years ago.2 Of those who were sympathetic, one in six fear
that they may become homeless themselves. 8 Moreover, polls and surveys
385. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, In 3 Progressive Cities, It's Law v. Street People, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1993, § 1, at 26; John Leo, Distorting the Homeless Debate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov.
8, 1993, at 27; Jill Smolowe, Giving the Cold Shoulder, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 28. Andrea Stone, For
Homeless, Streets are Meaner, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 3A; David Treadwell, Middle-Class
Backlash Hits at Panhandlers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1990, at Al.
386. See, e.g., Leo, supra note 385; Elena Neuman, Cities Get Tough With the Homeless, INSIGHT,
Feb. 14, 1994, at 6; Smolowe, supra note 385; see also Ellickson, supra note 20, at 4 (citing "disorder
fatigue").
387. Constance Casey, One in Six Americans Say they Fear They Could Become Homeless,
NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 28, 1995.
388. Id. This number only reflects those who are sympathetic; those who were not were not asked
the question. Since some of those people may also fear becoming homeless, the true number may
actually be greater than one in six, according to the Gallup Organization. Id. Interestingly, those who
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indicate that the public supports funding for solutions to homelessness. A
November 1993 Business Week/Harris poll found that 81% of the public would
be willing to pay higher taxes to fund increased government aid to homeless
people.38 9 A Spring 1994 poll found that 65% of the public would be willing
to pay higher taxes specifically to increase government spending on homeless
people and that this number was fairly evenly divided among Democrats and
Republicans; the poll takers also stated that this number has changed little over
the past ten years. 319
Polls also indicate that the majority of the public believes that homelessness
is attributable to "structural" causes. A 1990 Columbia University national
survey found that 71.6% of the public attributed homelessness to "forces
people can't control, such as housing shortages or changes in the economy;"
62% cited substance abuse as well; 29% cited laziness. 391 A 1994 Parade
Magazine national poll found that 56% of the public believe that homeless
people are not responsible for the situation they are in; 20% said they believe
homeless people are unwilling to work. 3" Polls also indicate that the majority
of the public supports long-term solutions. The Columbia survey found that
72.5% believed that government should provide rent subsidies. 3I A 1988
Media General/Associated Press poll found that 62.8% believed that govern-
ment should spend more to provide housing.3" The Parade poll found that
65% believe that the government should build housing for homeless peo-
ple. 3
95
feared they could become homeless were primarily women under the age of 35. Id.
389. Mark N. Vamos, ed., The Lowdown on High Taxes, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 1, 1993, at 35.
Similarly, a Fall 1995 Nielsen survey found that 95% of the public felt that alleviating hunger and
poverty is an "important" issue in the 1996 Presidential and Congressional election; 68% said it was
an "extremely" or "very" important issue. Nielsen Consumer Panel Data: Attitudes Toward Hunger and
Poverty in the United States; Food Action and Research Center, Unprecedented Nielsen Panel Research
of 16,000 households" (1995) (press release summarizing data). The survey found that as income
decreased an increasing proportion of respondents said alleviating hunger and poverty is "extremely"
important. Id.
390. Paul A. Toro & Manuel Manrique, National Public Opinion on Homelessness: Is There
Compassion Fatigue?, in ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PUBLC HEALTH ASSOCIATION (Nov.
1994); see also Barrett A. Lee, et al., Images of the Homeless: Public Views and Media Messages, in
Fannie Mae, 2 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 649, 658 (1991) (citing Media General/Associated Press
national poll conducted in November 1988 in which 60.2% said government should spend more to help
homeless, 51.9% of public willing to pay higher taxes; 1990 Columbia University national poll finding
71.2% believe federal government is doing too little to help; 53.4% would be willing to pay more
taxes); Parade Magazine National Poll, PARADE MAGAZINE, Jan. 9, 1994 (77% believe government
not doing enough; 65% would give if there were a check-off box on tax return form).
391. Lee et al., supra note 390, at 656. In each case the statistic shows those who believed that the
factor contributes "a lot" to homelessness. Id. The 1988 Media General/Associated Press poll found that
45.4 % said "society" is mainly at fault. Id.
392. PARADE, supra note 390, at 6.
393. Lee et al., supra note 390, at 658.
394. Id. A 1987 Nashville poll found that 78.9% believed government should provide more housing
and 87.9% said government should increase substance abuse treatment. Id.
395. PARADE, supra note 390, at 5.
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Public opinion polls also indicate that the majority of the public does not
perceive homeless people as especially dangerous and does not want them
removed from the streets. According to the 1990 Columbia survey, 31% said
they believed that homeless people are more dangerous than other people;
31
the Parade poll found that only 7% thought that homeless people are violent;
16% said they go out of their way to avoid homeless people.397 The Parade
poll also found that 82% of the public do not believe that homeless people
should not be prohibited from public places, such as libraries, parks, and mass
transit facilities; 69% said they did not want a legal procedure that would
remove homeless people from the streets.
398
Some commentators might argue that the prevalence of the "Not-in-My-
Back-Yard" phenomenon, or "NIMBYism," demonstrates the public's
antipathy to and fear of homeless people.399 According to this argument, the
majority of the public would oppose placement of a shelter, transitional home,
or other program for homeless people in their own neighborhood. The
Columbia University poll, however, found that 76.2% of the public would be
willing to have housing for homeless people in their own neighborhood.'
A 1987 Nashville poll found that 61.6% would be willing to have such housing
in their neighborhoods."°I
Nonetheless, this significant and consistent public support has not generally
given rise to broad-based public campaigns to pressure government officials to
provide such aid. Similarly, measures aimed against homeless people generally
do not meet organized opposition from large numbers of people. The public's
desire for government officials to effect solutions to homelessness, articulated
in response to questions, does not generally result in corresponding political
action or protest.' As a result, there is a discrepancy between public
opinion and the actions of public officials.
396. Lee et al., supra note 390, at 653 (noting also that causal observations of homeless on street
would tend to exaggerate public perception of deviance, since homeless persons behaving in peculiar
way are more likely to stand out and be remembered). They are also more likely to be noticed and
identified as homeless.
397. PARADE, supra note 390, at 5. Twice as many whites (20%) as blacks and Hispanics (10%)
said they do this. Id. 60% thought that homeless people contribute at least somewhat to the rising crime
rate. Id.
398. Id. at 4.
399. On NIMBYism generally, see No ROOM FOR THE INN, supra note 12 (documenting instances
of NIMBYism nationally); Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political Theory, Land Use
Policy, and the "Not in My Backyard" Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 945 (1992); Michael Deer &
Brendan Gleeson, Community Attitudes Towards the Homeless, 12 URB. GEOGRAPHY 155 (1991).
400. Lee et al., supra note 390, at 658. See also PAUL A. TORO & DENNIS M. McDONNEL,
BELIEFS, ATruDms AND KNOwLEDGE ABOUT HomELESSNESS: A SURvEY OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
5 (draft on file with author) (citing study showing public support for shelters in own neighborhood,
especially if shelters small).
401. Lee et al., supra note 390, at 658.
402. The failure of government officials to address homelessness effectively, and the continued
presence of homeless people on the streets, despite public support for solutions, may promote apathy
or frustration with the political process.
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At the same time, homeless people themselves face formidable barriers in
making their views heard, influencing public opinion, or rallying public
support. Effective participation in the political process is generally extremely
difficult for homeless people: caught in a daily struggle for simple survival,
they also generally lack access to basic communication devices, such as a
telephone, mailing address, and money. Further, they may also be denied
political rights, such as the right to vote, which are critical elements of
participation in public debate and political process.4 Illness, physical or
mental, pose additional barriers for many homeless people. In addition,
criminalization efforts themselves may burden their ability to express
opposition, through both fear of and the need to avoid arrest.'
Proponents of government actions directed against homeless people include
merchants or downtown associations; 5 increasingly they also include
politicians seeking to assign blame for deteriorating city conditions.406 In
some cities such measures have been adopted following or as part of political
campaigns.' Although they are in the minority, these groups are vocal,
active, and able to exert political influence effectively.4"' But because their
403. Indeed, homeless people have had to establish their right to vote through litigation, see, e.g.,
Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Decision of the District of Columbia Board of
Elections and Ethics, In the Matter of: The Applications for Voter Registration of Willie R. Jenkins,
et al., June 7, 1984. Legislation pending in Congress to establish the right nationally has not been acted
upon. See Voting Rights of Homeless Citizens Act of 1995, H.R. 55, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
404. Avoidance of arrest can add significantly to the tasks needed to be accomplished in the daily
struggle for survival, leaving little time or inclination for anything else. See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (testimony of Professor James Wright stating that
homeless people spend most of their time searching for food and shelter); Nancy Lewis, Cities Accused
of Hiding the Homeless, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1991, at A20.
405. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Central Dallas Association and American Alliance of Rights
and Responsibilities, Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Ken Koehn,
Merchants Get Tighter Laws to Stop Beggars, TAMPA TRB., July 23, 1993; see also Deer & Gleeson,
supra note 399; Margulies, supra note 399.
406. E.g., RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 102 (reporting New York City's effort
to crack down on homeless who wash car windows for money); Sidran Letter, supra note 20, at 1 ("the
conditions on our streets are intolerable and directly threaten the safety of all our citizens and the
economic viability of our downtown and neighborhood business districts.").
407. In San Francisco, then-candidate Frank Jordan campaigned for Mayor on a promise to "clean
up" downtown. See, e.g., Heather MacDonald, San Francisco Gets Tough With the Homeless, CITY
JOURNAL, Autumn 1994, at 33. Similarly, Seattle City Attorney Mark Sidran campaigned on a promise
to restore "order" to public areas. Carlton Smith, This is Sidran's City, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Mar. 9,
1994, at 17, 18. During his campaign for Mayor of New York, Rudolph Guiliani pointed to "squeegee
men," street windshield washers seeking spare change, as significant causes of the decline in the quality
of city life and sense of security. See RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 102; Francis X.
Clines, Candidates Attack the Squeegee Men, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, § 1, at 39. Each of these
politicians appears to have been invoking, expressly or not, the "broken window" theory of urban decay
articulated by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. See discussion infra note 422.
408. This combination of factors creates special dangers. The inability or unwillingness of the
majority of the public to exert political pressure on politicians to prevent criminalization responses,
combined with the barriers to their own political process, leaves homeless people very vulnerable. These
factors underscore the fundamental importance of the courts in setting constitutional limits on city
actions.
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views cannot be seen as reflecting public opinion,' they should not provide
a measure of public policy justification for a criminalization.
B. Other Justifications: Aesthetics, Economics, Safety, Health, and
Magnets
In addition to perceived public support for such policies, proponents of
efforts to criminalize activities associated with homelessness also outline other,
more targeted concerns. These fall into several often overlapping categories:
aesthetic, economic, safety, and health. Some also assert an interest in
preventing their city from becoming a "magnet" for homeless people. Some of
these arguments raise significant concerns. However, carefully considered, they
do not justify criminalization responses to homelessness.
Aesthetic concerns may include a desire to remove "unsightly people" from
public view,"'0 to make parks and other public areas more "pleasant,"
41
and to make downtown areas "welcoming to all." 412 They may also include
broad "quality of life" concerns, such as preserving and fostering parks and
other public areas as places of "interaction, integration, relaxation and reflec-
tion."413 Aesthetic concerns may also include a desire to avoid the moral
discomfort of confronting extreme destitution.4 4
An interest in a pleasing city appearance and environment may be
legitimate, appropriate, and rational. However, it may also be a pre-
text-perhaps not a conscious one-for rationalizing bias against a particular
group of people.415 Given the composition of the homeless population, such
bias may include racism and prejudice against people with disabilities. 41 6 Or
it may simply be hostility toward and a desire to exclude a particular group of
people who are viewed negatively because of untested stereotypes and
409. There are some examples of public support for referendum items creating criminalization
campaigns. These results, however, are also in some measure dependent on political influence and
resources, which affect the ability to present and advocate for a position to the voters; they also may
reflect a difference between the public in general and the voting public. The public opinion polls
generally report increased sympathy by minority and poorer persons; these may be the groups who are
less likely to vote. Moreover, other referendum votes (in San Francisco, for example) have yielded
different results. See No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 33-34.
410. E.g., "Police Memorandum Implementing San Francisco's Matrix Program," Appellant's
Opening Brief at 8, Joyce v. City of San Francisco, No. 95-16946 (9th Cir.) (filed Jan. 16. 1996).
411. See, e.g., Robert Tier, Let's Restore Urban Civility to City Streets, in 5 CUP REPORT 3,
(publication of Center For Urban Policy Research at Rutgers University) (1994).
412. Amincus Memorandum of American Alliance of Rights and Responsibilities at2, Joyce v. City
of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
413. Id. at 2.
414. See Streetwatch v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055, 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
415. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
416. It may also indicate bias against poverty. While classifications based on wealth alone do not
violate equal protection standards, see, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450
(1988), they implicate policy concerns in a society dedicated to openness and opportunity.
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stigmas.4"7 Further, aesthetic considerations, even where not pretextual,
should be given appropriate weight; they cannot, for example, outweigh a
homeless person's need to eat, sleep, and live.
Another set of concerns is economic. For example, merchants and other
business associations assert interests in encouraging shoppers and tourists to
frequent downtown business areas; they fear losing clients who they believe
may be frightened or put off by the presence of homeless people sleeping,
sitting, or begging in the vicinity.418 Cities also fear losing tourism and the
patronage of organizations hosting conventions or other large gatherings, such
as sports events, that bring visitors with the ability and inclination to spend
money.4 19 Some argue further consequences: the visible presence of homeless
people discourages visitors to downtown areas, leading to urban flight,
abandonment, and decay.4"
Urban decay and middle class flight are significant problems that should be
addressed. However, homelessness can hardly be considered a cause of these
major problems; rather, they are the result of major economic changes
affecting the structure of the national and global economy. Indeed, to some
extent homelessness is a result of these changes. Further, criminalization efforts
aimed at homeless people are unlikely to solve these problems; homeless
people chased away from outside one storefront will simply appear outside
another. In addition, some "economic" concerns may actually be a cover for
"private" bias or a desire by merchants to comply with what they assume to
be their customers' biases. Ultimately, the true solution is creating and
repairing infrastructure, bringing resources and jobs, addressing the cost of
living, and other major issues.
Public safety and crime prevention are also cited. For example, in
justifying its Matrix Program, San Francisco claimed that "homeless encamp-
ments can lead to drug sales, vandalism ... as well as facilitation of a host of
other crimes."421 This argument assumes that homeless people themselves are
likely to commit crimes. In addition, and much more broadly, proponents of
417. See infra note 425.
418. Tier, supra note 411, at 3; see also Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 11, Clements v. City
of Cleveland, 1:94-CV-2074 (N.D. Ohio) (filed Sept. 27, 1994); Amicus Memorandum at 3, Joyce, 846
F. Supp. 843.
419. See, e.g., NO HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 55-56 (describing Atlanta's need
to remove homeless people, claiming "pre-Olympic" renovations); Gwen Ifill, Sympathy Wanes for
Homeless, WASH. POST, May 21, 1990, at Al, A6. Note also Atlanta's 1989 idea of a downtown
"hospitality zone," which would remove homeless people from area to make more hospitable to tourists
and businesses. See RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 28, 29. See also Patton v. City of
Baltimore, Civ. No. 8-93-2389 (D.Md. Aug. 19, 1994), slip op. at36 (discussing city's and businesses'
concern with tourism).
420. Tier, supra note 411, at 3; Amicus Memorandum at 2, Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843.
421. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 847-90. The list also included "public elimination of bodily wastes,
and other unhealthful conditions" as part of the "other crimes," perhaps illustrating both the lack of
precision and the underlying assumptions of criminality at work.
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such ordinances argue that they are necessary to prevent more serious crimes.
Relying on the "broken windows" theory,4' this argument proposes that
failure to penalize the commission of minor "crimes" creates a sense of
"disorder" that allows more serious crimes to be committed by others. 423 In
another formulation, minimum standards of conduct and civility must be
enforced to maintain a sense of "order."424
This justification presents several difficulties. The first is factual: the
evidence is that homeless people are not more likely to be perpetrators of
serious crime than any one else; in fact they are more likely to be victims.4'
Further, there is evidence that the majority of the public does not perceive
homeless people as perpetrators of crime.426 The second is perhaps more
fundamental: to the extent the crime justification is concerned with future
criminal acts by others-based on the "broken window" or any other theory-it
is potentially illogical and certainly unfair. Punishing one group of people to
prevent a different group of people from committing crimes is clearly and
fundamentally at odds with basic concepts of equity.427
Significantly, the authors of the now classic article on the "broken
windows" theory have themselves raised questions about the legality and equity
of a police program to implement the theory, noting that it might not be "easily
reconciled with any conception of due process or fair treatment. "4 ' Further,
in a more recent article, they suggest that law enforcement may not be the only
means of repairing the "broken window." They describe a situation where
merchants concerned about homeless persons creating a mess and frightening
422. This theory posits that if one window in a building is broken, and left unrepaired, then
eventually all the other windows will also be broken. In essence, the theory holds, the failure to repair
sends the message that "no one cares," and permits and invites such actions. This leads to fear and
silence as the public begins to avoid the streets and other people on them. This abandonment then makes
the area vulnerable to serious crime. According to this theory, "[t]he unchecked panhandler is, in effect,
the first broken window." See James Q. Wilson & George L. Keling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, March 1982, at 36, 37 [hereinafter Wilson & Kelling, Broken Windows].
423. See, e.g., Amicus Memorandum at 7, Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843; Malcolm Gladwell, In N.J.
Enclave, Order is the Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1995, at Al; James Kunen, Quality and Equality,
NEW YORKER, Nov. 28, 1994, at 9; Smith, supra note 407; Sidran Letter, supra note 20, at 4.
424. Sidran Letter, supra note 20, at 2-4.
425. E.g., Pamela Fischer, Criminal Behavior and Victimization Among Homeless People, in
HOMELESSNESS: A PREVENTION ORIENTED APPROACH 92 (Rene Jahiel ed., 1992) (proportion of arrests
for serious offenses-i.e. excluding "relatively trivial" crimes, primarily street disorder-lower among
homeless than general population; many serious crimes such as burglary were directly associated with
homelessness, e.g. sleeping in abandoned buildings); Pamela Fischer, Criminal Activity Among the
Homeless: A Study of Arrests in Baltimore, 1 HOsPrrAL & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 46 (1988) (study
of 634 arrests of 275 homeless people); cf. Rodney Luckenbuck & Paul Acosta, The Street Beggar:
Victim or Con Artist?, POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 1993, at 126, 128 (police interviews of 36 beggars found
most had criminal histories; of these, 31% were "low grade" misdemeanors). For purposes of this
discussion, street disorder crimes should be excluded to avoid circularity in the justification.
426. See Lee et al., supra note 390, at 653; PARADE, supra note 390, at 5.
427. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonvile, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941).
428. Wilson & Kelling, Broken Windows, supra note 422, at 35.
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customers outside their stores complained to a police officer; instead of
rousting them the police suggested that the merchants hire the homeless persons
to clean the streets in front of the stores. The merchants agreed, solving their
problem and also assisting the homeless persons.429
Health concerns are also frequently cited. For example, concern about
eating, cooking, urinating and defecating in public, and the possible attraction
of vermin, setting of fires, and general unsanitary conditions are cited. 430 In
addition, some cite concerns about homeless people living in unsanitary
conditions, arguing that ordinances penalizing their activities are necessary for
their own protection. Some also argue that this is necessary for their mental as
well as physical health, and that enforcement of such ordinances will force
them to get help.43!
Public health concerns are undoubtedly important; and eating, sleeping,
urinating, and defecating in public present sanitation problems. However,
criminalizing these activities-in the absence of alternative places to perform
them-is not a rational or effective response. Because these activities must be
performed somewhere, if there is no alternative then they must be performed
in public. Criminalizing the performance of these activities in public cannot and
will not prevent it. Conversely, providing alternatives-such as public toilets,
day centers, shelter, or housing-would be both rational and effective.
Similarly, concern about the health of homeless people living on the streets is
important; however, criminalization does not address this concern. Again, the
difficulty is with the absence of alternatives; an effort to "force" people to seek
unavailable help is irrational and doomed to failure.432
Finally, another set of arguments is that criminalization measures are
necessary in order to prevent a given city from becoming a "magnet" for
homeless people.433 Such concerns are sometimes coupled with the belief that
certain parts of the country, such as the South, are more attractive to homeless
429. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Feb. 1989, at 48.
430. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae, American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities at 3;
Appellants' brief at 14, Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citing
internal city memoranda); Brief of Amicus Curiae Central Dallas Association and American Alliance
for Rights and Responsibilities at 10, Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994);
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 387-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (citing internal city
memoranda), superseded, 272 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994),judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).
431. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae Central Dallas Association and American Alliance for Rights
and Responsibilities at 10, Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 344; Vivian Rothstein, Their Space is Our Space,
N.Y. IMEs, Dec. 19, 1993, § 4, at 13.
432. Similarly, concern that beggars are using funds collected to satisfy addictions are misplaced
in the absence of available treatment. See U.S.C.M. 1995 REPORT, supra note 4, at 45 (noting lack of
services to address substance abuse).
433. For a general description of the "magnet" theory, see WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 148-49 ("In
discussing this issue with policy makers at the city level, I have often sensed a subtle, certainly
unspoken feeling that if the shelters are made too nice, it will only encourage homelessuess.") (emphasis
in original).
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people because of the warmer climate.434 This view, however, is not geo-
graphically limited.' The concern is that homeless people will move to a
city in large numbers unless steps are taken to make it "inhospitable" to them.
This "magnet" justification is both illegitimate and largely unfounded.
First, to the extent that it is predicated on an effort to "fence out indigents" it
is potentially unconstitutional.4 36 Second, it is not true that significant
numbers of homeless people migrate to areas perceived as more attractive or
less punitive; in fact, the majority of homeless people are long-time residents
of their communities.4 37 Further, to the extent that homeless people do
migrate, the evidence is that they do so in order to find work, not to find more
favorable street conditions.
431
C. Criminalization as Public Policy
Criminalizing homelessness is poor public policy for several reasons. First,
as discussed earlier, it may be constitutionally suspect, especially in contexts
where the city offers inadequate resources to its homeless residents.439 In
addition to the inherent problems this poses, it means that they are subject to
legal challenges, which may take years to resolve, regardless of outcome.
Especially in cases involving new or potentially gray areas, this possibility is
significant. The danger is that scarce city resources are expended on litigation
which, at most, will allow the city to arrest and fine its destitute residents." 0
In addition, criminalization measures do not reflect public sentiment; at
best, they represent the will of a vocal, politically influential minority. They
also reflect the frustration of the majority and powerlessness of those most
directly affected-homeless people. This combination of factors makes for
especially poor, and dangerous, public policy.
Criminalization responses foster divisiveness, pitting "us"-the
434. E.g., Sue Ann Presley, Homeless Feel Chill, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1995, at Al; comments
of Mayor Bruce Tartt of Austin, Texas, see supra note 81.
435. E.g., San Francisco's efforts to become less attractive cited in Joyce v. City of San Francisco,
846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994). It is also not limited to the streets; it is made as an argument
against providing shelter and other services, as well as welfare benefits. E.g., Jonathan Rabinovitz,
Fighting Poverty Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, § 1, at 41; Cheryl Weitzman, W7y Welfare
'Reform' seems Likely to Aggravate the Cost Dilemma, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995 (discussing "race
to the bottom"); see also No ROOM AT THE INN, supra note 12.
436. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), and text accompanying note 332.
437. See WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 70.
438. See WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 69-71 & n.24; HUD SHELTER REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
439. See discussion supra Section I.A.
440. Criminalizing responses are a poor use of fiscal resources. For example, according to a lbcal
group the city of Atlanta spends $300,000 to $500,000 a year to incarcerate homeless people for
sleeping and begging in public. ATLANTA TASK FORCE FOR THE HOMELESS, THE CRIMINA1UATION
OF POVERTY (Sept. 1993). In San Francisco, police spent 450 hours and $11,000 to arrest 15 people
for begging. RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at 40. In addition to these direct expenditures,
cities also use resources in crafting, promoting, and passing new laws, and defending their actions in
legislative and judicial forums.
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housed-against "them"-the homeless. For example, the San Francisco
"Matrix Quality of Life" program, designed to remove homeless people from
downtown areas, suggests by its very name that homeless people are not part
of the "life" the "quality" of which city government is concerned with protect-
ing. 441 In some areas, much political effort is expended in battles waged
between supporters of homeless people and proponents of "anti-homeless"
measures, deepening political, as well as social divisions." 2
Further, the criminalization response repeats the mistakes of the emergency
shelter response to homelessness, and it does so with much harsher and more
dangerous consequences. Like emergency relief, criminalization quickly, and
seemingly simply, addresses a primary, visible symptom of homelessness: the
presence of homeless people in public places. However, neither response
addresses the causes, and thus neither solves the problem. In both cases,
although to significantly different degrees, the problem is often worsened, as
homeless people become further marginalized and isolated." 3 Further,
criminalization significantly lowers any standards of acceptable survival
conditions, converting the debated living options into jail versus the streets,
instead of the streets versus a shelter, or a shelter versus housing. The result
is a debate that avoids meaningful, long term solutions to homelessness.
Perhaps most fundamental, criminalization responses do not and cannot
work. Like all human beings, homeless people must eat, sleep, and occupy
space. If they are prohibited from essential acts of existence in one area, they
will go somewhere else. Barring an express effort to exterminate them, 4"
homeless people cannot simply be made to disappear from all parts of a city,
a state, or the country.
V. BEYOND CRIMINALIZATION? A PROACTIVE APPROACH
City responses to court rulings overturning or restricting laws and practices
criminalizing homelessness suggest three general approaches. In a "reactive"
response, some cities are adopting much more narrowly drawn restrictions on
both begging and public place use, perhaps in an effort to avoid or create a
defense to litigation. As discussed above, however, such laws are unlikely to
be both constitutional and effective in meeting their proponents' goal of
removing homeless people or beggars from city areas. Thus this effort is both
441. See Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 846-49 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
442. For example, in Seattle a bitter political battle is being waged by advocates protesting the
City's policies. See Smith, supra note 407; see also Seattle Displacement Coalition, What You Always
Wanted to Know About Mark Sidran (on file with author); Sidran Letter, supra note 20.
443. In both cases, it may become more difficult to escape homelessness through employment:
potential employers generally disfavor applicants living in shelters, as well as applicants with arrest
records.
444. This has actually been suggested in some places. See supra note 205.
Vol. 14:1, 1996
Homelessness and Its Criminalization
misguided and unlikely to succeed.
Other cities are creating special outdoor areas similar to the "safe zones"
ordered by the court in Pottinger. As noted above, this approach is also
fundamentally flawed. Homeless people are likely to be isolated in the zones,
cut off from social services, jobs, and the rest of society."5 In addition,
confinement to the zones will likely accentuate the divisive difference between
"us" and "them," fostering ghettoization, and perhaps leading to additional
punitive or even violent responses. 46 Safe zones also threaten to sanction
living literally on the streets as an acceptable form of survival in American
society. Just as during the 1980s, temporary shelter became the housing of last
resort for the poor, 7 "safe zones" threaten an even lower floor, making the
streets the "housing" of last resort."'
In contrast to the reactive and safe zone approaches, some cities are
beginning to respond proactively to address the problem of homelessness.
Rather than attempting to sweep away or isolate homeless people, these cities
are initiating substantive programs including housing, health, and employment
measures. This approach aims to address the reasons that people are on the
streets, and to provide solutions.
Probably the most significant current example of this approach is a Dade
County, Florida initiative. In October 1993, Dade County, which encompasses
Miami, began collecting a meal tax to raise funds to provide assistance to its
homeless residents, including not only shelter but also housing, job training,
and social services. The 1% tax, limited to restaurants grossing over $400,000
annually, is expected to raise $7.5 million in its first year."9
The meal tax came after the court's ruling in Pottinger, and most likely as
a direct reaction to it. Moreover, it came after years of local government
efforts to remove homeless residents by arresting them, harassing them, and
confiscating their belongings. It is therefore not only an example of a positive,
proactive government program, but also an example of the significance of
litigation as a strategy to produce such a response. The meal tax is still in its
initial stages, and there has been some dispute over how the funds generated
will be used. Some controversy centers around the extent to which they will be
used for emergency shelter as opposed to permanent housing, employment
445. See McElroy v. Fort Lauderdale, No. 94-6266 (filed Mar. 30, 1994), (S.D. Fla. 1994).
446. See generally HOMBS, supra note 73.
447. See, e.g., Hopper, supra note 23; see also CHMsRTOPHER JENKS, THE HOMELESS 103-06
(1994).
448. Safe zones may simultaneously establish a new low for de facto "private" space, while also
further eroding the concept of "public" space, contrary to the intent of their proponents. In addition,
the downward slide may occur in increments, as in the shelter example, where shelter ranges from beds
to cots to floor space. See HUD SHELTER REPORT, supra note 7.
449. Larry Rohter, Miami Meal Tax to Aid Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1993, atA10; Dade
County Homeless Task Force, Jan. 28, 1993 (documents on file with author).
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services, health care, and substance abuse treatment.450 Nonetheless, the tax
is a positive step forward and a dramatic contrast to both the reactive and the
safe zone approaches.
In Reno, Nevada, a proactive response was initiated directly as a result of
litigation: by consent decree following a successful constitutional challenge to
that city's anti-sleeping laws, the city agreed to open a day center for homeless
people-who otherwise had nowhere to go but the streets. Previously, the city
had no day center at all.451
Nashville, Tennessee, offers an example of the proactive approach in the
panhandling context. There, local merchants proposed the adoption by the city
council of an anti-panhandling ordinance. In response, a local advocacy group
for homeless people arranged a meeting among the merchants and service
providers, as well as a local judge, who explained that the aggressive behavior
the merchants feared was already prohibited by existing law. As a result of the
group's discussion, the merchants agreed to the withdrawal of the proposed
ordinance and instead initiated a pilot parking meter program to collect money
to fund services to homeless people.4" 2
The proactive response seeks to address the causes of homelessness and to
provide solutions. To the extent the focus of this effort is emergency aid, such
as providing more shelter, it will be of limited effectiveness, although clearly
less destructive than arresting people or herding them into remote "zones."4 5
To the extent it focuses on addressing the causes of homelessness, by providing
affordable housing, adequate income, job training and placement, and social
services, it has the potential to be both humane and effective.4' Instead of
dividing their citizens, cities should work at forging the consensus to support
such solutions.455
In addition to working toward longer-term solutions, cities can also respond
constructively to immediate concerns. For example, making public toilets
available is more constructive, and effective, than making urinating in public
a crime. Ensuring that day labor pools-where many homeless people find
450. See, e.g., Letter from Gale Lucy, Miami Coalition for the Homeless, to Maria Foscarinis,
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty (May 9, 1995) (on file with author).
451. See generally Benavidez v. City of Reno, No. 92-25 (D. Nev. filed July 28, 1992).
452. See No HOMELESS PEOPLE ALLOWED, supra note 9, at 102, 103.
453. While they do provide emergency aid, shelters are a short-term "Band-Aid" measure that does
nothing to address the underlying causes of homelessness. Indeed, the emergency-shelter response may
fuel public frustration by creating the illusion that real solutions are in place, when in fact they are not.
454. See, e.g., Richard Wallace, Experts Say Give Long-Term Aid, Not Shelters, MIAMI HERALD,
June 23, 1993, at lB.
455. The Dade County meal tax is an example of a local initiative aimed at long-term solutions.
To the extent the County intends to use the tax revenues to provide housing, job training and placement
and social services, it will begin to provide solutions to homelessness residents. Local governments
pressing the federal government for more resources may be in a better position to do so having
undertaken such initiatives on their own.
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work-meet basic standards is more constructive than criminalizing beg-
ging.45 6 Establishing community councils that bring together business groups,
homeless people, and service providers can create dialogue and help forge
political consensus.4s7
VI. CONCLUSION
Criminalization responses to homelessness are inhumane, do not solve
the problem, and are subject to constitutional challenge. Where constitutional
violations are present, courts can and should step in to invalidate city laws and
policies. Judicial intervention is especially important given the difficulty of
using the political process to oppose them. Cities have the power to avoid such
intervention by rejecting criminalization responses, and they should do so.4"8
Such responses foster divisiveness, waste resources, and divert effort from
more positive responses. They are also unlikely to be effective, particularly as
they become more widespread: people who are homeless ultimately must live
somewhere. Rather than penalizing their homeless residents, cities should work
constructively to address the problem of homelessness. By taking this
approach, cities can constitutionally and responsibly address the common
interest of those who are homeless and those who are not: ending homeless-
ness.
456. Such regulation has been proposed in Atlanta (proposed ordinance on file with author).
457. See, e.g., RIGHT TO REMAIN NOWHERE, supra note 9, at94-96, 127-29 (initiatives in St. Paul
and Las Vegas). See also Maria Foscarinis & Jim Scheibel, Homelessness is the Foe, not the Homeless;
Criminalizing StreetDwellers Won't Solve the Problem, WeNeed Solutions thatAddress the Cause, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at B7.
There is also an important role for the federal government to play. The civil rights division of the
Department of Justice should defend civil rights of homeless people against "anti-homeless" actions; it
made a start in that direction by filing an amicus curiae brief in support of homeless appellees in Tobe
v. Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded, 272 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994),
judgment rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995), and in Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843
(N.D. Cal. 1994). At the same time, other departments-especially Housing and Urban Development,
Health and Human Services and Labor-should be implementing and mobilizing support for long-term
solutions to homelessness. See PRIORITY: HOMEI, supra note 26.
458. As the court in Johnson noted: "Although as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence the City
is not required to provide shelter or housing to anyone, the City is required to enforce its ordinances
constitutionally. As noted above, so long as the homeless have no other place to be, they may not be
prevented from sleeping in public. One way to remove the impediment to that ordinance's enforcement,
though, would be for them to have some other place to be other than in public." Johnson v. Dallas, 860
F. Supp. 344, 351 (N.D. Tex. 1994).

